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COMMENTS

Philosophical Hermeneutics: Toward an
Alternative View of Adjudication
Adjudication is interpretation: it is the process by which a
judge comes to understand a legal text and express its meaning.'
Two opposing views of adjudication prevail in Anglo-American
jurisprudence. The first sees judicial interpretation as being objectively constrained by legal rules and institutional principles
that compel a correct determination of textual meaning.2 The
second sees judicial interpretation as being subjectively determined by personal value preferences that render textual meaning contingent and r n ~ l t i p l e . ~
In a crucial way, these two opposing views of adjudication
are mirror images. Both views assume that interpretation is an
essentially free and discretionary activity; their disagreement
turns on whether freedom and discretion can be effectively constrained. While the first view insists that effective constraints
are available, the second view maintains that they are not. As a
result, both views focus their discussions largely on the availability of interpretive constraints. In the process, however, their dis1. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN.L.REv. 739 (1982). See generally
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 T E X .L. REV. 527 (1982). In this comment, "text"
connotes any written document, including reported judicial decisions, statutory and constitutional law, administrative regulations, and such writings as wills and contracts. In
each instance, the writing is an object o f interpretation. However, "text" does not connote only written documents. For example, Paul Ricoeur has argued that meaningful
social action shares the constitutive features o f a written text, and that the methodology
o f the social sciences is similar t o the procedures for the interpretation o f written texts.
P. RICOEUR,
The Model o f the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text, in HERM E N E U T I C S A N D T H E HUMAN
SCIENCES
197-221 (1982). In other words, the interpretation
o f "text" includes the interpretation o f social actions and relationships. See C. GEERTZ,
T H EINTERPRETATION OF CULTURES
3-30, 452 (1973) (culture is an "acted document," an
"ensemble o f texts," whose analysis is similar t o reading a manuscript); see also Taylor,
Understanding i n Human Science, 34 REV. METAPHYSICS
25 (1980);Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, 25 REV. METAPHYSICS
3 (1971).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 6-46.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 47-98.
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cussions fail to examine the validity of the assumption that interpretation is free and discretionary. For this reason, AngloAmerican jurisprudence remains irresolvably divided in its views
of adjudication.
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects the view of interpretation that is assumed, but never directly examined, in AngloAmerican juri~prudence.~
Philosophical hermeneutics contends
that interpretation is not a free and discretionary activity but
rather a dialogical interaction between interpreter and text that
is made possible through their mutual participation in a common medium of history and language. In other words, neither
interpreter nor text independently determines textual meaning;
both interpreter and text interdependently contribute to the determination of textual meaning. Thus, contrary to the Anglo4. Philosophical hermeneutics was first elaborated by Hans-Georg Gadamer. See H.
GADAMER,
TRUTHAND METHOD(1975). It is a general theory of interpretation that was
developed as a challenge to interpretive assumptions in social science and literary theory,
which are similar to the assumption underlying the opposing views of adjudication in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Philosophical hermeneutics is commanding increased attention as a powerful critique of traditional interpretive theories in these disciplines.
See, e.g., Z. BAUMAN,
HERMENEUTICS
AND SOCIAL
SCIENCES
(1978); J. BLEICHER,
THEHERMENEUTIC MAC IN AT ION: OUTLINE
OF A POSITIVE
CRITIQUE
OF ~ C I E N T I S M AND SOCIOLOGY
AS METHOD,
PHILOSOCONTEMPORARY
HERMENEUTICS:
HERMENEUTICS
(1982); J. BLEICHER,
PHY AND CRITIQUE
(1980); H. GADAMER,
PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS
(1976); R. HOWARD,
(1982); D. HOY,THECRITICAL
CIRCLE:
LITERATURE,
HISTHREEFACESOF HERMENEUTICS
TORY AND PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS
(1978); R. PALMER,
HERMENEUTICS:
INTERPRETATION THEORY
IN SCHLEIERMACHER.
DILTHEY,
HEIDEGGER,
AND GADAMER
(1969); P. RICOUER,
HERMENEUTICS
AND THE HUMAN
SCIENCES
(1981).
Recently, philosophical hermeneutics has gained some attention in Anglo-American
jurisprudential literature. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 BU.L. REV. 204, 221-22 (1980); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Forward: Names and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV.1 , 6 n.11 (1983); Fiss, Objectiuity and Interpretation, 34 STAN.L. REV.739,745 n.12 (1982); Hermann, Phenomenology,
Structuralism, Hermeneutics and Legal Study: Applications of Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMIL. REV.379, 398-409 (1982); Leedes,
An Acceptable Meaning of the Constitution, 61 WASH.U.L. Q. 1003 (1984); McIntosh,
Legal Hermeneutics: A Philosophical Critique, 35 OKLA.L REV.1 (1982). By contrast,
philosophical hermeneutics is the focus of tremendous jurisprudential discussion in Europe, particularly in West Germany. See, e.g., J. ESSER, VORVERSTXNDNIS
UND
METHODENWAHL
IN DER RECHTSFINDUNG
(1972); W. HASSEMER,
E I N F ~ H R UINN G
DIE GRUNDLAGEN DES STRAFRECHTS
77-80, 113-159 (1981); W. HASSEMER,
TATBESTAND
UND TYPUS:
ZUR STRAFRECHTLICHEN HERMENEUTIK
(1968); J. HRUSCHKA,
DIE KONUNTERSUCHUNGEN
STITUTION DES RECHTSFALLES
(1965); A. KAUFMANN,
ANALOGIE
UND "NATURDER SACHE"
& W. HASSEMER,
EINFUHRUNG
IN RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE
UND RECHT(1965); A. KAUFMANN
STHEORIE DER GEGENWART
(1981); M. KRIELE,THEORIE
DER RECHTSGEWINNUNG
(1976); F.
MULLER,JURISTISCHE
METHODIK
(1976); H. S C H ~ N E M ASOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN
NN,
UND
JURISPRUDENZ:
EINEE I N F ~ H R UFUR
N GPRAKTIKER
47-53 (1976).
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American jurisprudential view, interpretation is a structured
process of existential constraints.
Philosophical hermeneutics represents a direct theoretical
challenge to Anglo-American jurisprudence because the hermeneutic view of interpretation renders the Anglo-American debate
on the availability of constraints for judicial interpretation
groundless. For this reason, philosophical hermeneutics deserves
attention from the Anglo-American jurisprudential community.
At least, attention to philosophical hermeneutics may initiate
the critical examination of the nature of interpretation that has
heretofore been ignored. At most, attention to philosophical hermeneutics may lead to a transcendence of the opposing views of
adjudication that prevail in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Part I of this comment contends that Anglo-American jurisprudence is riven by opposing views of adjudication and that
this opposition is based on a common assumption about the nature of interpretation. Part I1 maintains that this opposition-the difference of views concerning the availability of interpretive constraints-has
captured the attention of AngloAmerican jurisprudence and diverted its focus from examining
the validity of the assumption about interpretation upon which
the opposition rests. Next, it examines the nature of interpretation from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics. Part I11
concludes that the theory of interpretation provided by philosophical hermeneutics represents a direct challenge to the Anglo-American assumption about interpretation and that this
challenge demands an Anglo-American jurisprudential response.

The two opposing views of adjudication found in AngloAmerican jurisprudence may be characterized as objective and
subjective interpretivism. Objective interpretivism represents an
effort to interpret a legal text without the influence of the judicial interpreter's value-orientation, through the construction of
interpretive constraints. Subjective interpretivism represents a
countereffort to deconstruct interpretive constraints in the belief
that interpretation is unavoidably controlled by personal value
preference^.^ Both views presume that interpretation is a free
5. The existence of an objective-subjective opposition has been recognized in legal
scholarship, Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALEL.J. 1205 (1981),
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and discretionary activity-free in the sense that the evaluation
of the text is normatively standardless, and discretionary in the
sense that judgment of the text entails a personal choice based
on privately held values. The difference between objective and
subjective interpretivism lies in their disagreement about the efficacy of constraints for interpretive activity.

A.

Objective Interpretivisrn: T h e Construction of
Constraints

The basic justification for the effort of objective interpretivism to secure value-free interpretation of a legal text is founded
on a fundamental tenet of the Anglo-American administration of
justice: rule of law demands that judicial interpretation occur on
in theories of literary and legal interpretation, Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX.L. REV.551 (1982); Fiss, supra note 1, a t 739,
in theories of judicial reasoning, Gross, The Theory of Judicial Reasoning-Toward a
Reconstruction, 66 KY.L.J. 801 (1978); Reynolds, The Concept of Ob~ectiuityin Judicial
LEGAL
POSITIVReasoning, 14 W. ONT.L. REV.1 (1975), and in legal history, F. SHUMANN,
ISM 95-119 (1963); Kaufman & Hassemer, Enacted Law and Judicial Decision in German Jurisprudential Thought, 19 TORONTO
L.J. 461 (1969).
Professor Roberto Unger has argued that all Western thought is riven by an antinomy between "universals" (objectivism) and "particulars" (subjectivism) that is manifest
in the persistently irresolvable antinomies of "theory and fact" in the sciences, "reason
and desire" in human studies, and "rules and values" in jurisprudence. R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS
133-38 (1975). In Professor Unger's view, the universals have
lost touch with the particulars, creating an unbridgeable gulf between them. This gulf
results because of the perception that universals are the only acceptable objects
thought:
The evisceration of particulars consists in treating particulars as fungible examples of some abstract quality. To be sure, the particulars as parts are recognized as more real than the universals as wholes. . . Nevertheless, as the concreteness of the particulars increases, so does their individuality. Therefore, it
becomes impossible t o think or to speak about them in general categories;
hence, given the nature of thought and language, impossible to think or speak
of them a t all. That much is implied by the antinomy of theory and fact.
Id. a t 136.
Ultimately, the objective-subjective opposition in Western thought may be traceable
A HISTORYOF PHILOSOPHY:
to Cartesian metaphysics. See generally 4 F. COPLESTON,
TO LEIBNIZ74-146 (1963). Descartes's ontological dichotomization of the
DESCARTES
world into subject (inquirer) and object (subject matter) yielded only two alternative and
mutually exclusive possibilities for providing an account of the world: subjective valuation or objective description. In other words, explanation is possible only in terms of the
subject or the object; their essential separation precludes explanation relying on both
The Question Concerning Technology, in THE
subject and object. See M. HEIDEGGER.
AND OTHERESSAYS
3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as M.
QUESTION
CONCERNING
TECHNOLOGY
HEIDEGGER.
Question]; M. HEIDEGGER,
The Age of the World Picture, in THEQUESTION
CONCERNING
TECHNOLOGY
AND OTHERESSAYS
115 (1977) [hereinafter cited as M. HEIDEGGER,Age]; M. HEIDEGGER,
BEINGAND TIME122-34 (1927).

.
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a basis other than in accordance with the will of a judge.e In
pursuit of this ideal, objective interpretivists seek to ensure
value-free interpretation in two principal ways. First, they seek
to minimize the normative gaps of the legal system to preclude
the invitation to rely on subjective values. Second, they seek to
maximize the institutional demands on judges to adjudicate in
accordance with the general constitutional character of the legal
system. In other words, the strategy is to contruct constraints on
the judicial interpreter in order to ensure his personal detachment from the legal text.
The hope of achieving personal detachment from the object
of interpretation is the reason for characterizing this view of adjudication as objective. Essentially, objectivity is a demand that
the object of interpretation be allowed to reveal its own meaning
independent of the value-laden interests of the interpreter.' For
instance, in the social and literary sciences objectivity is sought
by way of methodologies that proscribe the personal participation of the interpreter in his work. These methodologies preestablish impersonal criteria of evaluation that are characteristic of
the object of interpretation itself so that the object may reveal
its intrinsic meaning.8 The assumption is that the interpreter's
6. See generally F. HAYEK,
THERULEOF LAW(1975); F. HAYEK,
THECONSTITUTION
LIBERTY
(1960); R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS
76-103 (1975). Professor Mark
Tushnet has argued that legal objectivity cannot be questioned without undermining the
rule of law and thus the unique function of the judiciary in the American political order.
See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1206-07; Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Intepretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV.
L. REV.781 (1983) [hereinafOF

ter cited as Tushnet, Following the Rules].

7. A representative definition of objectivity is found in F. CUNNINGHAM.
OBJECTIVITY
SOCIAL
SCIENCE
(1973). An inquiry is objective if and only if:
[a] it is possible for its descriptions and explanations of a subject-matter to
reveal the actual nature of that subject-matter, where "actual nature" means
"the qualities and relations of a subject-matter as they exist independently of
an inquirer's thoughts and desires regarding them," and [b] it is not possible
for two inquirers holding rival theories about some subject-matter and having
complete knowledge of each other's theories. . . both to be justified in adhering
to their theories.
Id. a t 4 (footnote omitted). For other discussions of objectivity, see generally W.
NEWTON-SMITH,
THERATIONALITY
OF SCIENCE
(1981); K. POPPER,OBJECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE
(rev. ed. 1981).
8. One example of such a methodology is found in R. COLLINGWOOD,
THE IDEAOF
HISTORY
(1946). Collingwood argued that, in order to interpret the action of historical
agents, one must take into account the "inside" or "thought-side" of their actions. His
assumption was that historical events express the thought of their agents. Thus, understanding historical events required ascertainment of the thoughts of their agents, which
could be accomplished through "reenactment." By reconstructing the circumstances of
the historical event, the interpreter could project himself back into the position of the
IN
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value-laden interests in the text, if allowed to factor into his interpretation of it, obscures the text's meaning. In jurisprudence,
objectivity is sought in the same way for the same reason. The
methodology is the deductive application of preexisting legal
rules and institutional principles through which the legal text
may be understood in impersonal legal terms, not in terms of
personal nonlegal values.
Objective interpretivism found its first modern expression
in John Austin's construction of a "science of law."9 A basic
agent, "reenactn or "rethink" the reasons for the agent's actions, understand the thought
behind the deeds, and discern the meaning of the event. The methodology of reenactment is objective in the sense that it presupposes the historical interpreter's capacity to
acquaint himself directly with his subject matter (the historical agent) and to derive the
subject matter's own special meaning (the thought behind the acts). Reenactment is also
objective in the sense that it requires the negation of the personal and historical perspective of the interpreter and demands evaluation of the historical event as the agent himself evaluated it. Because the agent and the interpreter share a common rational humanity, the interpreter is presumably qualified to evaluate the agent he., the "text") on its
own terms. For a recent exposition and expansion of Collingwood, see R. MARTIN,HISTORICAL EXPLANATION:
RE-ENACTMENT
AND PRACTICAL
INFERENCE
(1977).
E. D. Hirsch's search for criteria to validate literary interpretations led him to a goal
of interpretation similar to Collingwood's: ascertainment of authorial intention. E.
I N INTERPRETATION
(1967). "The interpreter's primary task is to
HIRSCH,VALID~TY
reproduce in himself the author's 'logic,' his attitudes, his cultural givens, in short, his
world. Even though the process of verification is highly complex and difficult, the ultimate verificative principle is very simple-the imaginative reconstruction of the speaking
subject." Id. a t 242. Professor Hirsch's position has been accepted in other discussions of
the applicability of literary interpretation to judicial interpretation. See, e.g., McIntosh,
supra note 4.
Some judicial interpreters have thought that authorial intention is determinative of
textual meaning. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290'U.S. 398, 453
(1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) ("The whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution, is . . . to ascertain and give effect to the intent, of its framers
and the people who adopted it."). For an analysis and criticism of this theory of adjudication, see Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L.
REV.204 (1980).
This comment relies upon Hirsch's rival in hermeneutic philosophy, Hans-Georg
Gadamer, to critique the prevailing views of interpretation in legal thought. The reason
for this reliance is Hirsch's commitment to objectivity and his resultant inability to contribute to the transcendence of the objective-subjective opposition. For a good introduction to the issues of the Hirsch-Gadamer debate, see D. HOY,supra note 4, a t 11-72.
REASONINGS
62-136 (1964).
9. See generally J. STONE,LEGALSYSTEMAND LAWYERS'
Admittedly, Austin is not the first in the Anglo-American tradition to advocate objective
adjudication. Blackstone wrote "what that law is, every subject knows, or may know, if
he pleases; for it depends not upon the arbitrary will of any judge, but is permanent,
fixed, and unchangeable, unless by authority of parliament." 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 151. Elsewhere, he wrote:
T h e judgment, though pronounced or awarded by the judges, is not their determination or sentence, but the determination and the sentence of the law. I t
is the conclusion that naturally and regularly follows from the premises of law
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theme of his legal science was the separation of positive law
from transpositive consideration^.'^ The purpose of this separation was to allow logical analysis of the positive law in order to
ascertain the essential concepts and structures of the legal order
reflected in it." Using this legal scheme required one to
fix in the mind a map of the law, so that all its acquisitions
made empirically in the course of practice, take their appropriate places in a well-conceived system; instead of forming a chaotic aggregate of several unconnected and merely arbitrary
rules. It tends to produce the faculty of perceiving at a glance
the dependencies of the parts of his system . . . .I2

With this legal map, Austin believed that, consistent with his
rational description of law, the dominant method of judicial in-

.

and fact . . which judgment or conclusion depends not therefore on the arbitrary caprice of the judge, but on the settled and invariable principles of
justice.
3 id. a t 434. Indeed, the notion of legal objectivity is ultimately attributable to the
Greeks. Greek mythology portrays the goddess Themis with the sword of justice in her
right hand and the scales of justice in her left. She is blindfolded, symbolizing impartiality. The assumption is that justice originates in judgments that are free from the personal prejudices of the legal administrator. Judgment is reached only through the
mechanical balancing of evidence that is sorted onto the dishes of the scale by other
similarly impartial persons. Reynolds, supra note 5, a t 2. Interestingly, legal objectivity
is not endemic only to Anglo-American jurisprudence; it is the primary paradigm of jurisprudential and judicial analysis in legal systems following the civil law tradition. See
THECIVILLAWTRADITION
(1969).
generally J. MERRYMAN,
10. Throughout his work, Austin pleaded for a strict separation of law as it is and
law as it ought to be:
The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be
or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed
standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though
we happen to dislike it . . . .
J. AUSTIN,
THEPROVINCE
OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED
AND THE USESOF THE STUDY
OF
JURISPRUDENCE
184 (Library of Ideas ed. 1954). Austin did not dismiss the influence
moral opinion had on the development of law, or conversely, the influence the law had on
moral standards. He believed, however, that the determination of moral norms upon
which law ought to rest was not within the province of jurisprudence but was a subject of
the "science of legislation." Id. a t 127, 372. The science of jurisprudence concerned itself
only with the study of laws once they were posited. See generally Hart, Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.L. REV.593 (1958); Rumble, The Legal
Positivism of John Austin and The Realist Movement in American Jurisprudence, 66
L. REV.986 (1981).
CORNELL
11. According to Austin, every legal order has the same basic constituent parts. Concepts like duty, right, liberty, injury, punishment, redress, law, sovereignty, and independent political society belong to every legal order because "we cannot imagine coherently
a system of law (or a system of law as evolved in a refined community), without conceiving them as constituent parts of it." J. AUSTIN.supra note 10, a t 367.
ON JURISPRUDENCE
OR THE PHILOSOPHY
OF POSITIVE
LAW
12. 2 J. AUSTIN.LECTURES
1095 (5th ed. R. Campbell 1885).
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terpretation was syllogistic: legal classification of the facts and
their subsumption under general rules.13
Nevertheless, Austin acknowledged the existence of "judiciary law."14 In instances of linguistic ambiguity in legal terms,
interstices in the body of positive law, and social change rendering law archaic, judges are invited to legislate rules on the basis
of their own value-orientations.15 This reality introduced considerable dissymmetry into Austin's rational system of law.16 His
response was to conceive of an institutional mechanism that harmonized particular judge-made rules with the general legal order. Reasoning that judicial activity is an extension of the sovereign's power, Austin concluded that the sovereign could
legitimate judge-made rules either by express acceptance or by
acquiescence to their existence." In other words, judges could be
institutionally constrained from arbitrarily legislating rules to
the extent that they "legislat[e] in subordination to the
s~vereign."'~
Austin's construction of a normatively complete system of
law and an institutional constraint on judicial interpretation was
prototypical for subsequent jurisprudential efforts to achieve le13. See Rumble, supra note 10, a t 1017-18.
supra note 12, a t 620. See generally Hart, supra note 10, a t 608-10
14. 2 J. AUSTIN.
& nn.33-35; Rumble, supra note 10, at 1017-21.
15. Austin saw ambiguous legal terms as "hotbeds of competing analogies. The indefiniteness is incorrigible. A discretion is left to the judge. Questions arising on them. . .
are hardly questions of interpretation or induction, for though the rule were explored
supra note 12, a t 1001
and known as far as possible, doubt would remain." 2 J. AUSTIN,
n.20. Austin also contended that judicial legislation was necessary "to make up for the
supra note 10, at 191.
negligence or the incapacity of the avowed legislator." J. AUSTIN,
In this regard, judicial legislation was of "obvious utility" to adapt law to social change. 2
J. AUSTIN.supra note 12, a t 612. Austin noted that equity courts were created because of
the unwillingness of common law courts to "do what they ought to have done, namely to
model their rules of law and of procedure to the growing exigencies of society, instead of
stupidly and sulkily adhering to the old and barbarous usages." Id. a t 647.
16. Austin wrote:
Wherever, therefore, much of the law consists of judiciary law, the entire
legal system, or the entire corpus juris, is necessarily a monstrous chaos: partly
consisting of judiciary law, introduced bit by bit, and imbedded in a measureless heap of particular judicial decisions, and partly of legislative law stuck by
patches on the judiciary law, and imbedded in a measureless heap of occasional
and supplemental statutes.
2 J. AUSTIN,supra note 12, a t 660.
17. "For, since the state may reverse the rules which [the judge] makes, and yet
permits him to enforce them by the power of the political community, its sovereign will
'that his rules shall obtain as law' is clearly evinced by its conduct, though not by its
express declaration." J. AUSTIN,supra note 10, a t 31-32.
18. 2 J. AUSTIN,supra note 12, a t 510.
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gal objectivity. Thus, nineteenth century legal formalism propounded the view that a legal system is a closed logical system
in which correct decisions are deducible from predetermined legal rules by pure logical operation.'' This formalist view of law
gained widespread acceptance in legal scholarship and judicial
opinions.'O Although strict legal formalism has been largely
abandoned, its substance persists in many contemporary theories of judicial decision.'l This is especially apparent among the
"new analytical j~rists,"'~who seek to document the theoretic
fetter^,"'^ or the preexisting principles of rational decision, that
constrain judicial interpretation.
One of the leading figures in the new analytical movement
has been H. L. A. Hart. His strategy was to minimize the frequency of the linguistic indeterminacy of rules that invites reliance on subjective values. In his estimation, a legal rule has a
"core of certainty" and a "penumbra of
In the core of
19. See generally Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM.J. LEGALHIST.251
(1975). Typically, the following five postulates accompany the legal formalist's position:
[Flirst, that every concrete legal decision [is] the "application" of an abstract
legal proposition t o a "fact situation"; second, that i t must be possible in every
concrete case to derive the decision from abstract legal prepositions by means
of legal logic; third, that the law must actually or virtually constitute a
"gapless" system of legal propositions, or must, a t least, be treated as if it were
such a gapless system; fourth, that whatever cannot be "construed" legally in
rational terms is also legally irrelevant; and fifth, that every social action of
human beings must always be visualized as either an "application" or "execution" of legal propositions, or as an "infringement" thereof.
M. WEBER,LAWIN ECONOMY
A~~ SOCIETY
64 (1954) (footnote omitted).
20. See infra notes 47-49.
21. See Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGALSTUD.351 (1973). Strict legal formalism is the deductive application of preexisting rules. Substituting "rational" and "principles" for "deductive" and "rules" produces a broader definition of formalism: the rational application of preexisting principles. In this definition, "principles" may mean
rules as well as propositions of purpose or value. Professor Kennedy argues that purposebased reasoning is "no less dependent on rules" and "no less vulnerable to the dilemma
of formality" than is traditional rule formalism. Id. a t 396-98; see also Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.L. REV.1685 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Kennedy, Form and Substance]. For example, under Kennedy's analysis, Hart
and Sack's portrayal of judicial decision as "rational implications of the 'shared purposes'" implicit in the "social order" ultimately possesses the same structure as rule
THELEGALPROCESS
668-69 (Cambridge tent. ed. 1958).
formalism. H. HART& A. SACKS,
22. See generally Summers, The New Analytical Jurists, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 861
(1966).
23. See Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the
Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM.
L. REV.359 (1975).
24. H. HART,THECONCEPT
OF LAW119 (1961); see also Hart, supra note 10, a t 607.
The problem of penumbral vagueness is inevitable: "the price to be paid for the use of
general classifying terms in any form of communication concerning matters of fact." H.
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certainty, the applicability of the rule to a factual circumstance
is clear. However, in the "fringe of vagueness," the normative
guidance of the rule dissipates, thus imposing a "creative function" upon the judge to resolve the
While syllogistic
reasoning may be appropriate in the core of certainty, it cannot
be employed in the fringe of vagueness, and resort to subjective
values is i n e ~ i t a b l e . ~ ~
HART,supra. a t 125. Because of the finitude of language, language cannot be successfully
employed for the subsumption of the infinity of unique constellations of facts available
in the world. Id. Basically, Hart agrees with the Austrian legal sociologist Karl Wurzel,
who compared concepts in legal rules to photographs with vague and gradually vanishing
outlines. "Every concept in the empirical sciences has its central image and beside it a
zone of transition gradually vanishing into nothingness." K.'WURZEL.METHODS
OF JURIDICAL THINKING
IN SCIENCE
OF LEGAL
METHOD372 (1917). But Hart's more direct philosophical indebtedness for the penumbral vagueness, or "open texture of law," idea is to
SOC'Y119
Waissman's address on verifiability in Supp. vol. 19 PROC.ARISTOTELIAN
H.L.A. HART12-19 (1981).
(1945). See generally N. MACCORMICK,
OF LAW120, 144 (1961).
25. H. HART,THECONCEPT
26. Id. at 122-25. The problem is that linguistic indeterminacy allows multiple
meanings, presenting a judge with "a fresh choice between open alternatives" that cannot be decided with formal logic but only with his "discretion." Id. Elsewhere Hart
wrote:
If a penumbra of uncertainty must surround all legal rules, then their application to specific cases in the penumbral area cannot be a matter of logical deduction, and so deductive reasoning, which for generations has been cherished
as the very perfection of human reasoning, cannot serve as a model for what
judges, or indeed anyone, should do in bringing particular cases under general
rules. In this area men cannot live by deduction alone. And it follows that if
legal arguments and legal decisions of penumbral questions are to be rational,
their rationality must lie in something other than a logical relation to premises.
. . . [I]t seems true to say that the criterion which makes a decision sound in
such cases is some concept of what the law ought to be . . . .
Hart, supra note 10, a t 606-08. Importantly, Hart contended that normative guidance
was not wholly lacking in penumbral areas. Overarching social policies from which legal
rules are derived may cover the "penumbra of doubt."
The point must be not merely that a judicial decision to be rational must be
made in the light of some conception of what ought to be, but that the aims,
the social policies and purposes to which judges should appeal if their decisions
are to be rational, are themselves to be considered as part of the law in some
suitably wide sense of "law". . . . [Ilnstead of saying that the recurrence of
penumbral questions shows us that legal rules are essentially incomplete, and
that, when they fail to determine decisions, judges must legislate and so exercise a creative choice between alternatives, we shall say that the social policies
which guide the judges' choice are in a sense there for them to discover; the
judges are only "drawing out" of the rule what, if it is properly understood, is
"latent" within it. To call this judicial legislation is to obscure some essential
continuity between the clear cases of the rule's application and the penumbral
decisions.
Id. a t 612. To the extent that Hart relies on purpose or value propositions to reach decisions in the penumbra of doubt, his concept of law remains formalistic. See supra note
21.
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However, Hart argued that "preoccupation with the penumbra" is a mistake-one that confuses and obstructs the advance
of juri~prudence.~'
[T]o soften the distinction [between clear and penumbral
cases] is to suggest that all legal questions are fundamentally
like those of the penumbra. It is to assert that there is no central element of actual law to be seen in the core of central
meaning which rules have, that there is nothing in the nature
of a legal rule inconsistent with all questions being open to reconsideration in the light of social poli~y.~"
On the contrary, the meaning of rules is normally not in doubt;
rules have a core of "settled" meaning.29Proper attention t o this
fact might reveal a n "essential continuity" in clear and unclear
~ ~ this reason, Hart's concept of law is
case a d j u d i ~ a t i o n .For
heavily rule-oriented, focusing on the normative constraints imposed on a d j ~ d i c a t i o n . ~ ~
Another of the leading analysts is Ronald Dworkin. Like
Hart, Dworkin acknowledges the existence of "hard cases" in
which "no settled rule dictates a decision."32 However, unlike
Hart, Dworkin contends that a judge is not free to interpret
from nonlegal values,33 but is constrained t o interpret in light of
the political structure of his community. Hard-case adjudication
27. Hart, supra note 10, at 614-15.
28. Id.
29. Id. a t 614.
30. Id. a t 612.
31. "[Tlhe life of the law consists to a very large extent in the guidance both of
officials and private individuals by determinate rules which, unlike the applications of
variable standards, do not require from them a fresh judgment from case to case." H.
OF LAW132 (1961).
HART,THECONCEPT
L. REV.1057, 1060 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
32. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV.
Dworkin, Hard Cases]. Presumably, "easy" cases would be cases in which rules with
settled meaning do dictate a decision. Dworkin has argued that rules are applicable in an
"all-or-nothing fashion," meaning that "[ilf the facts a rule stipulates are given, then
either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not,
in which case it contributes nothing to the decision." Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35
U. CHI.L. REV.14, 25 (1967). In short, "rules dictate results, come what may." Id. a t 36.
33. Dworkin interpreted Hart as contending that a judge, who possesses no rules to
guide his adjudication, exercises "strong discretion," meaning that "he is not bound by
any standards from the authority of law. . . ." Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI.
L. REV.14, 35 (1967). However, it is questionable whether Hart can be so interpreted.
See supra note 26; see also Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALEL.J.
823, 845 (1972) (Hart uses "rule" in a broad sense that includes principles and standards); Reynolds, Dworkin as Quixote, 123 U. PA.L. REV.574, 596-99 (1975) (by "discretion" Hart simply means that a judge must use his best judgment in appealing to public
standards in resolving borderline cases).
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requires reference to the set of principles that, comprising a
community's "constitutional morality," are "presupposed by the
laws and institutions of the community" and are therefore inferable from those laws and institution^.^^ By referring to these
principles, a judge is capable of adjudicating a hard case in a
fashion that preserves the institutional integrity of the political
community and achieves the result to which a party is entitled.36
In short, the legal system is "a seamless web" that provides sufficient normative guidance for the correct judicial resolution of
every legal dispute.36
34. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 32, a t 1105-07.
35. Dworkin's argument, which he entitles "the rights thesis," is that judicial decisions in hard cases are characteristically generated by principle not policy. Id. at 1060.
Arguments of principle justify a decision by showing that it respects or secures some
individual or group right; they are distinguishable from arguments of policy that justify a
decision by showing that it advances b r protects some collective goal of the community
as a whole. Id. a t 1059. Dworkin believes that principles are discoverable from the institutional structures that are constitutive and regulative of the context in which the judicial decision must be made. In the case of a game, for example, the adjudication of a
hard case by a referee is institutionally constrained to that particular decision which
preserves the integrity of the game. Id. a t 1078-82. "We do not think that he is free to
legislate interstitially within the 'open texture' of imprecise rules. If one interpretation of
[a] rule will protect the character of the game, and another will not, then the participants have a right to the first interpretation." Id. a t 1080 (footnote omitted). The
uniquely correct interpretation of the rule is found when the referee reconstructs the
game's character by posing to himself different theories about the nature of the game.
(In this respect, Dworkin's interpretation theory is notably similar t o Collingwood's "reenactment" theory. See supra note 8.) When the referee determines which of the theories most appropriately fits the institutional features of the game, then that theory of the
game's character guides his resolution of the dispute. Consequently, only one party has
the right to win the dispute, which right is the referee's obligation to determine in light
of the genuine institutional character of the game. The same applies to a judge who must
enforce "existing political rights" latent in the combination of the constitutional values
and substantive rules of his political community. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 32, a t
1063. For a good discussion and critique of this argument, see Note, Dworkin's "Right
Thesis," 74 MICH.L. REV.1167 (1976); see also Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation
of a Judge: The HartlDworkin Dispute, 75 MICHL. REV.473 (1977); Greenawalt, Policy,
Rights and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV.991 (1977).
Rolf Sartorius has expressed views that are consistent with Dworkin's. Sartorius argues that while on occasion "extra-legal" considerations such as policy or value enter
judicial reasoning, "legal principles" are always available to govern their use and, accordingly, "the judge is in all cases ultimately guided by legal principles which severely limit,
if they do not totally eliminate, his discretion." Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial
Legislation, 8 AM. PHIL.Q. 151 (1971). Moreover, he maintains that "a litigant before a
court of law is not in the position of one begging a favor from a potential benefactor, but
rather in that of one demanding a particular decision as a matter of right, as something
to which the law entitles him." Id. a t 153; see also Sartorius, The Justification of the
171 (1968).
Judicial Decision, 78 ETHICS
36. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 32, a t 1093-96; see also Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL.624, 634 n.7 (1963) ("an arrangement of entitlements"); Note, supra
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In a recent clarification of his position, Dworkin analogizes
The task
hard-case adjudication to a "chain novel" enterpri~e.~'
of a writer to contribute one chapter to a novel-in-progress requires him to determine the direction of developments in prior
chapters. Then, consistent with the demands of coherency for
the entire work, the writer must advance these developments in
the same direction through his chapter.38 Similarly, the task of a
judge to adjudicate a hard case in the common law enterprise
requires him to determine the structure of his legal community-from its profound constitutional arrangement to the details of its statutory schemes and judicial opinions. Then, consistent with the demands of coherency for his work, the judge must
write his decision " 'going on as before' rather than by starting
in a new direction as if writing on a clean slate."3s Indeed, the
note 35, a t 1169-70 (concluding that Dworkin's concept of law is "gapless"). T o the extent that Dworkin asserts overarching legal principles from which legal conclusions can
be deduced, his jurisprudence may be considered formalist in substance. See supra notes
19, 21.
37. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U . FLA.L. REV. 165 (1982). T h e "chain
novel" enterprise is described as follows:
Imagine, then, t h a t a group of novelists is engaged for a particular project.
They draw lots to determine the order of play. The lowest number writes the
opening chapter of a novel, which he then sends t o the next number who is
given the following assignment. He must add a chapter to that novel, which he
must write so as to make the novel being constructed the best novel i t can be.
When he completes his chapter, he then sends the two chapters to the next
novelist, who has the same assignment, and so forth.
Id. a t 166-67.
38. Dworkin wrote:
Now every novelist but the first has the responsibility of interpreting what has
gone before . . Each novelist must decide what the characters are "really"
like; what motives in fact guide them; what the point or theme of the developing novel is; how far some literary device or figure consciously or unconsciously
used can be said to contribute to these, and therefore should be extended, refined, trimmed or dropped. He must decide all this in order to send the novel
further in one direction rather than another. But all these decisions must be
made, in accordance with the directions given, by asking which decisions make
the continuing novel better as a novel.
Id. a t 167. For a more thorough examination of the chain-novel enterprise and its consequences for aesthetic and legal interpretation, see Dworkin, supra note 1.
39. Dworkin, supra note 37, a t 168.
Deciding hard cases a t law is rather like this strange literary exercise. The similarity is most evident when judges consider and decide "common-law" cases;
that is, when no statute figures centrally in the legal issue, and the argument
turns on which rules or principles of law "underlie" the related decisions of
other judges in the past. Each judge is then like a novelist in the chain. He or
she must read through what other judges in the past have written not simply
t o discover what these judges have said, or their state of mind when they said
it, but to reach a n opinion about what these judges have collectively done, in

. .
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judge is duty-bound by his participation in the common law enterprise to follow the legal history he findq40 thus, "the constraint, that [he] must continue the past and not invent a better
past, will often have the consequence that [he] cannot reach decisions that he would otherwise, given his own political theory,
want to reach."4'
The construction of constraints on judicial interpretation
has also proceeded outside the analytic movement. This is exemplified in Herbert Wechsler's "neutral principles" and John Hart
Ely's "textual determinism" approaches. Herbert Wechsler's
neutral principles approach requires judges to decide cases on
the basis of general principles that the judges are committed to
apply consistently in all similar cases.42John Hart Ely's textual
the wav that each of our novelists formed an ooinion about the collective novel
so far written. . . . Each judge must regard himself, in deciding the new case
before him, as a partner in a complex chain enterprise of which these innumerable decisions, structures, conventions, and practices are the history; it is his
job to continue that history into the future through what he does on the day.
He must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of
his own. So he must determine, according to his own judgment, what the earlier decisions come to, what the point or theme of the practice so far, taken as
a whole, really is.
Dworkin, supra note 1, a t 542-43.
40. "A judge's duty is t o interpret the legal history he finds, not to invent a better
history." Dworkin, supra note 1, a t 544.
41. Dworkin, supra note 37, a t 169. Dworkin's chain-novel analogy is a valiant attempt to outflank both objective and subjective interpretivism. Chain novel interpretation is neither purely objective, since i t allows room for reinterpretation of the prior
writings in a way that both unifies and provides new meaning, nor purely subjective,
since i t prevents the interpreter from proceeding independently of prior institutional
writers. In this regard, the chain-novel analogy has much to commend it. Nevertheless,
as Professor Stanley Fish has perceptively and correctly argued, "Dworkin repeatedly
falls away from his own best insights into a version of the fallacies (of pure objectivity
and pure subjectivity) he so forcefully challenges." Fish, supra note 5, a t 552. Dworkin
"posits for the first novelist a freedom that is equivalent t o the freedom assumed by
those who believe t h a t judges (and other interpreters) are bound only by their personal
preferences and desires . . . ." Id. a t 555. Moreover, he views later novelists as "bound by
a previous history in a way that would be possible only if the shape and significance of
that history were self-evident." Id.
42. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.L. REV.1,
11-12, 15 (1959).
[Tlhe main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect t o every step that is involved in reaching
judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that
is achieved[,] . . . [resting] on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality,
tested not only by the instant application but by others that the principles
imply[.]
H. WECHSLER,PRINCIPLES,
POLITICS,AND FUNDAMENTAL
LAW21 (1961); see also Bork,
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determinism requires judges to look only to the words of the
document and, when faced with opaque terms, to the intent of
those who wrote it. In Ely's view, judges "should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in
the written Constitution . . . ."43 In essence, both of these theories assert that the proper institutional role of judicial interpreters is to follow the available norms in good faith and to commit
to the logical implications of their appli~ation.~'
The common element in each of the legal theories
Neutral Principles a n d Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.L.J. 1,6-7 (1971) (advocating a requirement that decisions rest on principles that are neutral in content and
application); Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN.L. REV.1113, 1113-14 (1980)
(arguing that the ruling in Harris v. McRae was inconsistent with the operative principle
of Roe v. Wade and criticizing the Court for not being principled).
In his criticism of Wechsler, Professor Martin Shapiro observed a n essential objectivism in the "neutral principles" approach:
[Nleutral principles or standards are really the objective and eternal rules embedded in a "Blackstonian" body of law and the Constitution, which the judge
discovers and applies to the case before him. When the defenders of neutral
principles speak of the judge as motivated by reason, not will, they visualize
the common law judge who did not command (make law) but simply discovered by deductive and analogical reasoning which of the great verities of the
common law controlled the particular set of facts before him. Since the common law itself was the embodiment of reason and was applied by a purely
reasonable process, there was no need of, nor could there be any room for,
judicial prejudice, fiat, or preference.
Shapiro, The Supreme Court a n d Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral
Principles, 31 GEO.WASH.L. REV.587, 593 (1963) (footnote omitted).
43. J. ELY,DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST1, 3, 13-17 (1980). Professor Ely felt secure in
asserting that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided because he found it obvious that the
purported right there vindicated was based on no "value inferable from the Constitution" and "lacks connection with any value the Constitution marks as special." Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf, A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALEL.J. 920, 933, 949 (1973).
Professor Ely's understanding of interpretation resembles Professor Thomas Grey's. See
Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN.L. REV.843 (1978); Grey, Do We Have a n Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN.L. REV. 703 (1975).
T h e term "textual determinism" is adopted from Professor Owen Fiss who appropriately found the term t h a t usually attaches t o Ely's work, "interpretivism," to be misdescriptive. Fiss, supra note 1, a t 743. As will be shown in part I1 of this comment, interpretation is in fact much more than that contemplated in Professor Ely's approach.
Professor Ely's "textual determinism" facially resembles Professor George Christie's
objectivism. Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALEL.J. 1311 (1969). Concluding that
contemporary legal theorists had failed to "confirm our intuition that judicial decisionmaking is objective," Professor Christie argued that only "those marks on paper called
statutes and cases" could be accepted as the fixed reference points for judicial interpretation. Id. a t 1326.
44. See Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 6 (arguing that Ely's and Wechsler's theories are inconsistent with liberalism).
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presented-Austin's legal science, Hart's minimization of penumbral doubt, Dworkin's hard case argument, Wechsler's neutral principles, and Ely's textual determinism-is the effort to
ensure that the legal text is interpreted without the influence of
the judicial interpreter's value-orientation. In each case, normative gaps in the body of law are minimized, and institutional demands on the judicial interpreter are maximized, with the design
of ensuring that the legal text is interpreted in harmony with
the external legal order. However, this common effort makes
sense only if the judicial interpreter is viewed as being free to
determine the outcome of his interpretation in accordance with
personal value preferences. In other words, by constructing interpretive constraints, each theory presumes that interpretation
is an activity in need of constraint because it is fundamentally
free and discretionary.
This presumption is evidenced in Dworkin's chain novel
analogy. Dworkin maintains that the contributor of a chapter to
the novel-in-progress must be seriously committed to continue
the work of his predecessor^;^^ indeed, he must be duty-bound to
"advance the enterprise in hand."46 In other words, an awareness on the part of the novelist and the judge of their responsibility to the corporate enterprise will supposedly check a temptation to strike out in some direction of their own. Only with a
sense of duty to the enterprise will the novelist and the judge
comport themselves as partners in the chain rather than as free
and independent agents. In short, the entire account depends on
the possibility of novelists and judges (both interpreters) comporting themselves in some fashion that is inconsistent with the
chain enterprise; i.e., in a free and discretionary fashion. The
question then becomes whether novelists and judges can comport themselves in a fashion inconsistent with the chain enterprise. If one assumes that the answer is yes, then one must see
that interpretation as free. If one assumes that the answer is no,
then one must see interpretation as something entirely different.
As will be argued in parts 11and I11 of this comment, interpretation is something different from that presumed by objective
interpretivists.
45. Dworkin, supra note 37, at 167 ("[IJnthis case the novelists are expected to take
their responsibilities seriously, and to recognize the duty to create, so far as they can, a
single unified novel rather than, for example, a series of independent short stories with
characters bearing the same names.").
46. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 543.
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Subjective Interpretiuism: The Uncontrollable Assertion
of Values

Objective interpretivism has not gone without critical response. In the early part of the twentieth century, a growing tendency towards objective formalism in legal e d ~ c a t i o n , ~legal
'
s c h o l a r ~ h i p , and
~ ~ judicial opinions49 sparked the vigorous
countermovement of legal realism.60 Legal realism had many dis47. In legal education, Christopher C. Langdell's case-method approach to the study
of law was gaining widespread acceptance in the law schools. Professor Rumble has suggested that this was the "signal event" in the emergence of legal realism. Rumble, supra
note 10, a t 996.
Langdell's case method presumed that the law consisted of certain principles and
rules that could be distilled out of selected cases because legal doctrines evolved slowly
and traceably in relatively few key cases. He argued that the number of legal principles
and rules is "much less than is commonly supposed; the many different guises in'which
the same doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and the great extent to which
legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being the cause of much misapprehension."
OF CASESON THE LAWOF CONTRACTS
viii-ix (2d ed. 1879).
C. LANGDELL.
A SELECTION
Consequently, "[tlhe vast majority [of cases] are useless, and worse than useless, for any
purpose of systematic study." Id. a t viii. In order to find the rules of law, a jurist need
only analyze the key cases in the evolution of a legal doctrine. Once in possession of
these rules, the "true lawyer" would apply them "with constant facility and certainty to
the ever-tangled skein of human affairs." Id.
48. In legal scholarship, the American Law Institute undertook its first attempt to
restate the law in order to clarify the fundamental principles behind the "swamp of decisions." Address of Elihu Root in Presenting the Report of the Committee, 1 A.L.I. PROC.
pt. 2, 48, 52 (1923). The ALI was established because of the growing recognition that the
law is uncertain. "[TJhe confusion, the uncertainty, [is] growing worse from year to
year. . . . [Wlhatever authority might be found for one view of the law upon any topic,
other authorities could be found for a different view . . . . [Tlhe law [is] becoming
guesswork." Id. a t 48-49.
Similarly, legal scholars such as Joseph Beale and Samuel Williston asserted that
the varied issues in their fields, conflicts of law and contracts respectively, were governed
ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS
by unified bodies of legal doctrine. See 1 J. BEALE,A TREATISE
92-94 (1935) (determination of domicile has certain automatic legal consequences that
T H ELAWOF CONTRACTS
apply regardless of circumstance). See generally S. WILLISTON,
(1920) (deriving the law of contracts from few general principles of universal applicability).
49. In federal and state judicial opinions, social legislation was invalidated partly on
the "logic" of general constitutional concepts such as liberty of contract and substantive
due process. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U S . 45 (1905); see also Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 184 111. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
(1978); G. GILMORE,
THE
50. See generally T. BENDITT.LAWAS RULEA N D PRINCIPLE
LAW 41-98 (1977); W. RUMBLE,AMERICAN
LEGALREALISM1-135
AGES OF AMERICAN
(1968); R. SUMMERS,
INSTRUMENTALISM
AND AMERICAN
LEGALTHEORY
(1982).
Langdell's case method approach was criticized for its exclusive focus on the operation of rules in judicial decisions. According to William 0.Douglas, such a focus
grossly oversimplifies and distorts the nature of law. After all, law is neither
more nor less than a prediction of what a governmental agency or other agency
of control will do under a given situation. A study of the legal literature exem-
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sonant voices; however, these voices achieved harmony in the belief that a legal text has any number of possible meanings, that
interpretation consists of choosing one of those meanings, and
that selecting a particular meaning forces the judge to express
his own values. In short, legal realism contended that interpretation is an uncontrollably subjective value-based activity. Legal
realism is thus the basic expression of subjective interpretivism
in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Legal realism originates with distrust of "the theory that
traditional prescriptive rule-formulations are the heavily operative factor in producing court decision^."^' This "rule-skeptiplified by judicial opinions supplies part, but only part, of the material necessary to make such a prediction. The other psychological, political, economic,
business, social factors necessary to complete that prediction are innumerable.
The weakness of the old system was that all of these more general and imponderable factors were eliminated from consideration. I t was for that reason that
the nonconformists in legal education began to raise disconcerting notes.
AND FINANCE:
THEADDRESSES
AND
W. DOUGLAS,
Education for the Law, in DEMOCRACY
PUBLICSTATEMENTS
OF WILLIAM
0.DOUGLAS
AS MEMBER
AND CHAIRMAN
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
278, 280 (1969).
Williston's scholarship in contracts was criticized, for example, for presupposing the
unity of the legal universe, a notion impossible to reconcile with the totality of judicial
decisions. The "legal universe," wrote Walter Wheeler Cook, "is far more complex than
that visualized by the more orthodox writers of whom Professor Williston is an example." Cook, Williston on Contracts, 33 ILL. L. REV.497, 514 (1939). Cook argued that a
unified body of legal doctrines could be maintained only if one completely ignored some
judicial decisions or failed to distinguish consistently between actual holdings and dicta.
According to Cook, Williston's treatise on contracts illustrated both these vices. Id. a t
499, 514. For a contemporary critique of recently perceived formalizations of law, see
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN.L. REV.
387 (1981).
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Roscoe Pound were vigorous in their condemnation of
judges who decided cases solely in a formally deductive manner from legal generalizations. See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM.L. REV.12, 16 (1910); Pound,
Liberty of Contract, 18 YALEL.J. 454,457, 478-80 (1909). Holmes, for instance, criticized
analysis that relied on the logical compulsion of legal generalizations t o reach particular
conclusions. "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." Lochner v. New York,
198 U S . 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes insisted upon the role of unconscious factors in reaching decisions. "The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition
more subtle than any articulate major premise." Id. This skepticism towards general
rules as a means of compelling particular decisions and this insistence on the role of
unconscious factors in the adjudicatory process found resonance in the realist movement
as two of its central themes. See W. RUMBLE,
supra, a t 39-40.
51. K. LLEWELLYN.
JURISPRUDENCE:
REALISMIN THEORYAND PRACTICE
56 (1962).
"[Tlhe theory that rules decide cases seems for a century to have fooled not only libraryridden recluses, but judges. More, to have fooled even those skillful and hard-bitten firsthand observers of judicial work: the practitioners." Llewellyn, The Constitution a s a n
Institution, 34 COLUM.L. REV.1, 7 (1934).

3231

PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS

34 1

c i ~ m was
" ~ ~motivated by the interpretive malleability and normative ambiguity of legal materials. For example, Karl
Llewellyn observed two judicial techniques of case construction
that permit either an extremely narrow or an extremely wide ap~ ~ the "strict" or "orthodox" techplication of p r e ~ e d e n t .With
nique, a judge can, "through examination of the facts or of the
procedural issue, narrow the picture of what was actually before
the court and can hold that the ruling made requires it to be
understood as thus restricted."" In other words, a judge can, if
he desires, limit the authoritative value of an "unwelcome precedent" by so narrowly confining it to its particular facts that its
ruling could be made to apply only to "red-headed Walpoles in
pale magenta Buick cars."bb By contrast, the "loose view of precedent" holds that once "a court has decided . . . any point or all
points on which it chose to rest a case," then "[nlo matter how
broad the statement, no matter how unnecessary on the facts or
the procedural issues, if that was the rule the court laid down,
then that the court has held."" The judge can, if he chooses,
capitalize on "welcome precedents" for the purpose of authoritatively supporting any proposition he desire^.^' Essentially, the
same judicial techniques were thought to be available for statutory c o n s t r u ~ t i o n . ~ ~
This range of interpretive possibilities for case and statutory materials decreased their normative value for the realists.
52. This term appears to have been coined by Jerome Frank. See J . FRANK.
LAWAND
MODERN
MIND(1949). Professor Rumble treats this term as being descriptive of the
main currents of the realist movement. See W. RUMBLE,
supra note 50, a t 48-106. But for
a n argument distinguishing influential realist Karl Llewellyn's work from "rule-skeptiKARLLLEWELLYN
AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT
408 n.22 (1973). In
cism," see W. TWINING.
any event, rule-skepticism for the realists did not mean that judges completely disregarded rules in adjudication but only that rules were one factor among many, including
social, moral and psychological factors, which influenced judicial decisions. W. RUMBLE,
supra note 50, a t 189-90.
53. K. LLEWELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE
BUSH66-68 (1960). In an earlier book, Llewellyn
explicated 64 techniques of precedential construction. K. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON
LAW
TRADITION].
TRADITION
77-91 (1960) [hereinafter cited as K. LLEWELLYN,
54. K. LLEWELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE
BUSH66 (1960).
55. Id. a t 67.
56. Id. a t 67-68.
57. Id. a t 68.
58. "[Algain and again . . . I have had to insist that the range of techniques correctly
available in dealing with statutes is roughly equivalent to the range correctly available in
TRADITION,
supra note 53, a t 371. Llewdealing with case law materials." K. LLEWELLYN,
ellyn listed 47 examples of contradictory, yet legally acceptable, canons of statutory construction, id. a t 522-35, to illustrate that "there are two opposing canons on almost every
point." Id. a t 521.
THE
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But the realists maintained that such normative ambiguity was
inconsequential in comparison to the equivocity resulting from
the plethora of squarely conflicting judicial decisions. For example, Benjamin Cardozo believed that every legal precedent could
be matched by another reaching an opposite conclusion.5s Consequently, a judge could find precedential authority for any proposition on nearly any issue.'O
The absence of consistent normative guidance from legal
materials had two important consequences for the realists' picture of judicial interpretation. First, the normative void necessitated judicial choice; it "disposes of all questions of 'control' or
dictation by pre~edent."~'With conflict among precedential authorities, a judge was compelled to choose from among them the
authority that best assisted him in resolving his case. The authority he chose to rely upon was solely within his control; he
possessed "sovereign prerogative of ~hoice."'~As Herman Oliphant pictured the necessity of judicial choice, every case considered by judge or student "rests at the center of a vast and
empty stadium. The angle and distance from which that case is
viewed involves the choice of a seat. Which shall be chosen?
Neither judge nor student can escape the fact that he can and

60. Belief in the plurality of judicial authority on any issue was virtually universal
among the realists. See, e.g., Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355
(1908) (Justice Holmes portrayed judicial decision as a balancing of opposed principles);
supra note 59, at 40 (one principle or precedent often is matched by another
B. CARDOZO,
supra note 52, a t 111 n.2 ("You will alpointing to an opposite conclusion); J. FRANK,
most always find plenty of cases to cite in your favor."); K. LLEWELLYN,
supra note 51, a t
339 ("Our whole body of authoritatively accepted ways of dealing with authorities . . . is
a body which allows the court to select among anywhere from two to ten 'correct' alternatives in something like eight or nine appealed cases out of ten."); Cohen, The
Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD.L. REV.5, 11 (1937) (cases often present "a plaintiff principle and a defendant principle," each opposing the other); Corbin,
The Law and the Judges, 3 YALEREV.234, 246 (1914) (prior judicial decisions "are not
harmonious; in them can be found authority for both sides of almost any question");
Dickinson, The Law Behind Law: 11, 29 COLUM.
L. REV.285, 298 (1929) (broad general
principles of the law have a significant habit of traveling in pairs of opposites); Douglas,
Stare Decisis, in ESSAYSON JURISPRUDENCE
FROM THE COLUMBIA
LAWREVIEW18, 19
(1963) ("[Tlhere are usually plenty of precedents to go around; and with the accumulation of decisions, it is no great problem for the lawyer to find legal authority for most
propositions.").
61. K. LLEWELLYN,
TRADITION,
supra note 53, at 76.
62. O.W. HOLMES,
Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED
LEGALPAPERS
PREROGATIVE
xiii (1962).
210, 239 (1920), quoted in E. Ros~ow,THESOVEREIGN
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must choose."s3 In sum, judges, not rules, possessed the critical
function in case adjudication.
The second consequence of the normative void for the realists' picture of adjudication was that judicial choice could be
made and justified only on extralegal grounds. Llewellyn reasoned that if conflicting legal premises are available, then "there
is a choice in the case; a choice to be justified; a choice which
can be justified only as a question of policy-for the authoritative tradition speaks with a forked t~ngue."'~In other words,
without the authority of dispositive rules, judges could only resort to nonlegal values to resolve disputes. Some realists hoped
that the extralegal grounds the judge used to justify his decision
would be considerations of the social consequences of his intended decision as weighed against possible alternative decisions. In the balancing of possible social consequences resulting
from his decision, the judge became, for the realists, a kind of
social engineer, and the law became his instrument to facilitate
social progress and j~stice.'~
63. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J . 71, 73 (1928).
supra note 51, a t 70. Felix Cohen made a similar statement:
64. K.'LLEWELLYN,
"[Nlo one of these rules [of prior cases] has any logical priority; courts and lawyers
choose among competing propositions on extra-logical grounds." F. COHEN,
ETHICAL
SYSTEMS A N D LEGALIDEALS.AN ESSAYON THE FOUNDATIONS
OF LEGALCRITICISM
35 n.47
(1959).
65. This instrumental aspect of legal realism was the result of the influence of William James's and John Dewey's philosophical pragmatism. See generally W. RUMBLE,
supra note 50, a t 22-35. The pragmatists were
supra note 50, a t 4-20, 72-78; R. SUMMERS,
antiformalist thinkers. William James stressed that theorists should turn "away from
abstraction . . . , from verbal solutions, from had a priori reasons, from fixed principles,
closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins." W. JAMES,What Pragmatism
OF WILLIAM
JAMES
376, 379 (J. McDermott ed. 1968). Instead,
Means, in T H EWRITINGS
theorists should adopt a "pragmatic" orientation, by "looking away from first things,
principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and . . . looking towards last things, fruits,
consequences, facts." Id. a t 380 (emphasis omitted). This "pragmatic method," or resultorientation, was concerned with the "ways in which existing realities may be changed."
Id. Similarly, John Dewey argued that theoretical decision-making should be result-oriented. "The problem is not to draw a conclusion from given premises; that can best be
done by a piece of inanimate machinery by fingering a keyboard. T h e problem is t o find
statements of general principle and of particular fact which are worthy to serve as premAND CIVILIZATION
134 (1931). Thus, the "logic of rigid demises." J. DEWEY,PHILOSOPHY
onstration" must be replaced by a "logic of search and discovery," a "logic relative to
consequences rather than to antecedents," a "logic of inquiry into probable consequences." Id. a t 138-39; see also J . DEWEY,LOGIC: THE THEORY
OF INQUIRY
(1938); J.
LOGIC(1916).
DEWEY,
ESSAYSI N EXPERIMENTAL
This result-orientation was picked up by the realists. Llewellyn wrote that realistic
jurisprudence "fits into the pragmatic and instrumental developments in logic." K.
LLEWELLYN,
supra note 51, a t 28. With society in a constant state of flux, "and in flux
typically faster than the law, . . . the probability is always given that any portion of law
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But other realists believed that the justification of the judicial decision would not be socially instrumental, but subjectively
intuitive. Psychology teaches, wrote Jerome Frank, that "the
process of judging" does not begin at a premise and proceed to a
c o n c l u ~ i o n"Judging
.~~
begins rather t.he other way around-with
a conclusion more or less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily
starts with such a conclusion and afterwards tries to find premises which will substantiate it."67 Frank argued that the same
must apply to judges.
Now, since the judge is a human being and since no
human being in his normal thinking processes arrives a t decisions (except in dealing with a limited number of simple situations) by the route of . . . syllogistic reasoning, it is fair to assume that the judge, merely by putting on the judicial ermine,
will not acquire so artificial a method of reasoning. Judicial
judgments, like other judgments, doubtless, in most cases, are
worked out backward from conclusions tentatively formulated.68

Frank believed the formulation of the conclusion, whether done
vaguely, tentatively, or expressly was an expression of the "subjective sense of justice inherent in the
Other realists also believed that judicial intuitions about the
particular justice of a case motivated judges to resolve that case
in a particular way. Llewellyn wrote that the judicial mind is
driven by a sense of "Justice-for-All-of-Us."70
Benjamin Cardozo
argued that a judge's decision in choosing between alternative
standards is based on the "conviction in the judicial mind7' that
the standard selected leads to " j ~ s t i c e . " Finally,
~~
according to
Judge Frank Hutcheson, judicial decisions are reached by an inneeds reexamination to determine how far it fits the society it purports to serve." Id. a t
55. Thus, the realists advocated an examination of law to the end that it might be made
adaptable to man's own ends. "A good deal of fruitless controversy has arisen out of
attempts to show that [a] definition of law. . . is either true or false," wrote Felix Cohen.
"A definition of law is useful or useless. I t is not true or false, any more than a New
Year's resolution or an insurance policy." F. COHEN.Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, in THE LEGALCONSCIENCE:
SELECTED
PAPERSOF FELIXS. COHEN
33, 62 (L. Cohen ed. 1970).
66. J. FRANK.
supra note 52, a t 100.
67. Id.
68. Id. a t 101 (citation omitted).
69. Id. a t 281 (citation and emphasis omitted).
70. K. LLEWELLYN,
supra note 51, a t 339.
71. B. CARDOZO,
supra note 59, a t 41.
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tuitive "hunch."72 "[Tlhe judge really decides by feeling, and not
by judgment; by 'hunching' and not by ratiocination . . . ."73 For
Judge Hutcheson, "the vital, motivating impulse for the Ijudicial] decision is an intuitive sense of what is right or wrong for
that cause."74
For some legal realists, judicial intuitionism was simply inHaving raised profound
adequate for a theory of adjudi~ation.'~
skepticism in the objective formalist model of adjudication,
some realists felt compelled to provide some hope for legal consistency and certainty. Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated the
principle of hope: predictionism.
People want to know under what circumstances and how far
they will run the risk of coming up against what is so much
stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to
find out when this danger is to be feared. The object of our
study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the
public force through the instrumentality of the courts.76
72. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
L.Q. 274 (1929); cf. Prott, Updating the Judicial "Hunch":
Decision, 14 CORNELL
Esserk Concept of Judicial Predisposition, 26 AM.J. COMP.L. 461 (1978) (inaccurately
comparing a German theorist's legal hermeneutic theory with Hutcheson's "hunch"
notion).
73. Hutcheson, supra note 72, a t 285.
74. Id. John Rawls has written the following in contrasting systematic theories of
justice with the intuitionist-pluralist perspective:
Intuitionist theories, then, have two features: first, they consist of a plurality of
first principles which may conflict to give contrary directives in particular
types of cases: and second, they include no explicit method, no priority rules,
for weighing these principles against one another: we are simply to strike a
balance by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right.
A THEORY
OF JUSTICE
34 (1971). This is an apt description of the ground of
J . RAWLS,
legal realism's judicial intuitionism.
75. This inadequacy was observed from without the ranks of legal realism:
They have assured us of the immense range of irrational considerations entering into the judicial process, the subjectivity necessarily inherent in judicial
determinations, the dominating influence of prejudices, idiosyncrasies, and
preconceived social theories in the disposition of lawsuits . . . without presenting us with an embracive theory of the constructive elements necessary for the
building of a serviceable science of legal methodology.
Bodenheimer, Analytical Positivism, Legal Realism, and the Future of Legal Method,
44 VA.L. REV.365,376 (1958). One reason for this inadequacy may be that realists were
intent on destroying, rather than constructing, theory. See Rumble, The Paradox of
American Legal Realism, 75 ETHICS166, 173-76 (1965).
76. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.L. REV.457 (1897); see also K. LLEWELLYN, THEBRAMBLE
BUSH13 (1960) ("[Tjhe main thing is seeing what officials do . . . and
seeing that there is a certain regularity in their doing-a regularity which makes possible
prediction of what they and other officials are about to do tomorrow.").
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However, realists who were committed to predictionism could
not agree on those factors from which accurate predictions could
be made.77The only agreement was that one had to look beyond
the "paper" rules, or the formal legal rules enunciated in judicial
decisions, and discover the "real" rules, or the psychological, political, economic, business, and social factors that accounted for
judicial behavior in a particular case.7s
77. Fred Rodell argued that one could look a t the "vast complex of personal factors-temperament,
background, education, economic status, pre-Court career" and
make predictions based on these factors "with a surprising degree of accuracy." Rodell,
For Every Justice, Judicial Deference is a Sometime Thing, 50 GEO. L J 700, 700-01
(1962). Llewellyn cited 14 "steadying factors" upon which predictions could be based. K.
LLEWELLYN.
TRADITION,
supra note 53, a t 19-51. Herman Oliphant argued that the predictable element in judicial decisions is the judges' "response to the stimuli of the facts
of the concrete cases before them . . . The response of their intuition of experience to
the stimulus of human situations is the subject-matter having the constancy and objectivity necessary for truly scientific study." Oliphant, supra note 63, a t 159.
78. In other words the "real" rules of the judicial process are the regularities of
judicial behavior. The paper-real rule distinction is found in both J. FRANK,
COURTSON
TRIAL:MYTHA N D REALITY
IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE336-37 (1949), and K. LLEWELLYN,
supra
note 51, a t 21-27.
This emphasis on studying and describing actual judicial behavior led some realists
to attempt to create a precise science of judicial behavior through empirical research.
This largely inspired the foundation of the Institute of Law a t the John Hopkins University in 1928. The aim of the school was "the development of the scientific study of law.
All else [was] incidental." Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303, 309
(1927). Achievement of this objective required research of an empirical nature. Walter
Wheeler Cook emphasized that
the only way to find out what anything does is to observe it in action and not
to read supposedly authoritative books about it, or to attempt by reasoning to
deduce it from fundamental principles assumed to be fixed and given. The consequence of this assumption is that only a small part of the work of the staff of
the Institute will be with books in libraries; by far the larger part will be concerned with the difficult, time-consuming, and expensive task of gathering and
interpreting the facts concerning the operation of our legal system.
Cook, Scientific Study and the Administration of Justice, 34 MD. ST. B.A. REP. 148
(1929).
One interpretation of the realist movement is that it was not a critical reaction to
Langdellian and formalist model of law. See G. GILMORE,
supra note 50. Gilmore believes
that
the adepts of the new jurisprudence-Legal Realists or whatever they should
be called-no more proposed to abandon the basic tenets of Langdellian jurisprudence than the Protestant reformers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries proposed to abandon the basic tenets of Christian theology. These were
the ideas that "law is a science" and that there is such a thing as "the one
True rule of law."
Id. a t 87. Gilmore therefore maintains that "[r]ealist jurisprudence proposed a change of
course, not a change of goal." Id. a t 100. Although this interpretation is defensible, it
does not represent the whole movement. Some realists doubted that a science of law was
possible a t all. See, e.g., Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL.L. REV.761, 773 (1932);
Llewellyn, The Theory of Legal "Science," 20 N.C.L. REV. 1, 10-22 (1941). For a good

.
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Jerome Frank rejected the search for "real" rules. In
Frank's estimation, "the major cause of legal uncertainty is factuncertainty-the unknowability, before the decision, of what the
trial court will 'find' as the facts, and the unknowability after
the decision of the way in which it 'found' those facts."79 Thus,
Frank concluded that "it is impossible, and will always be impossible, because of the elusiveness of the facts on which decisions turn, to predict future decisions in most (not all) lawsuits."80 Fact-uncertainty arises for two reasons. First, in
addition to possessing discretion in rule-applying, a judge possesses discretion in fact-finding. "When the oral testimony is in
conflict as to a pivotal fact-issue, the trial judge is a t liberty to
choose to believe one witness rather than an~ther."~'This discretionary fact-finding is "almost boundless" since appellate
courts rarely interfere with such determination^.^^ Second,
judges react to facts very subjectively. These judicial subjectivities include "unique, idiosyncratic, sub-threshold biases and
predilections" which are impossible to precisely define.83 Similarly, jurors reach their fact-determinations on "emotional responses to the lawyers and w i t n e s ~ e s . "Because
~~
of these unadiscussion o f t h e branch o f legal realism concerned with creating a "science o f law," see
Verdun-Jones, Cook, Oliphant & Yntema: T h e Scientific Wing of American Legal RealL.J. 3, 249 (1979); see also Schlegel, American Legal Realism
ism (pts. 1-2), 5 DALHOUSIE
and Empirical Social Science: T h e Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO
L.
REV. 195 (1980); Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From
L. REV. 459 (1979).
t h e Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO
79. J. FRANK,supra note 52, at xiv. Frank characterized his argument as "fact-skepticism." It marks one o f t h e major divisions in t h e realist movement. See generally W .
RUMBLE,
supra note 50, at 107-36. Frank classified t h e realists into two groups: ruleskeptics and fact-skeptics. Rule-skeptics, o f whom Llewellyn was "the outstanding representative," focus on appellate courts and strive for greater legal certainty. Fact-skeptics
focus on trial courts and deny t h e possibility o f accurate formulations o f real rules. J.
FRANK,supra note 78, at 73-75.
80. J. FRANK,supra note 78, at 74 ("the pursuit o f greatly increased legal certainty
is, for t h e most part, futile-and . . . its pursuit, indeed may well work injustice").
81. Id. at 57.
82. Id.
83. J. FRANK,supra note 52, at xxvi. " T h e reactions o f trial judges or juries t o t h e
testimony are shot through with subjectivity." J. FRANK,supra note 78, at 22. Elsewhere,
Frank called these subjectivities "prejudices o f judges . . . [that] have no 'large scale
social' character, and lack uniformity. T h e y are distinctly individual, unconscious, unget-at-able." T h e y are "concealed, publicly unscrutinized, uncommunicated . . . secret,
unconscious, private, idiosyncratic." Frank, "Short of Sickness and Death": A S t u d y of
Moral Responsibility i n Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U. L. REV.545, 573, 582 (1951).
84. J. FRANK.supra note 78, at 130. Frank continues, "they like or dislike, not any
legal rule, but they d o like an artful lawyer for t h e plaintiff, t h e poor widow, t h e brunette
with the soulful eyes, and they d o dislike the big corporation, t h e Italian with a thick,
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voidable subjectivities in the judicial process and the
impossibility of rationalizing them, Frank concluded that "real"
rules could never be formulated concerning the probable outcome of cases.86
Although the energy of legal realism was largely spent by
m i d c e n t ~ r y its
, ~ ~legacy remains. The critical legal studies movement is one example of the contemporary continuation of the
legal realist attack on objective legal analysis.s7 Critical legal
scholars agree with the realists' contention that legal analysis is
nothing more than a veneer covering deeper motives for judicial
decisions. But critical legal scholars depart from the realists by
providing a neo-Marxist, materialist explanation, rather than a
psychoanalytic account of judicial decision^.^^ They undertake
this explanation in two principal ways. First, they show legal
foreign accent." Id. Elsewhere, Frank contended that "adequate fact-finding . . . requires
devoted attention, skill in analysis, and, above all, high powers of resistance to a multitude of personal biases. But these qualities are obviously not possessed by juries. They
supra note 52, a t 192.
are notoriously gullible and impressionable." J. FRANK,
85. Any attempt to increase the capacity of "real" rules to scientifically accurate
predictions about judicial behavior, Frank believed, was impossible:
[Slince most persons consider that a true science makes predictions possible,
we ought to put an end to notions of a "legal science" or a "science of law,"
unless we so define "legal" or "law" as to exclude much of what must be included in the judicial administration of justice, because no formula for predicting most trial-court decisions can be devised which does not contain hopelessly
numerous variables that cannot be pinned down or correlated.
J. FRANK.
supra note 78, a t 190 (footnote omitted).
supra note 50, a t 238-39.
86. See generally W. RUMBLE.
87. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN.L. REV.623, 623-30 (1984) (critical legal studies is a "direct descendent" of legal realism); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV.L. REV.
563, 564-73 (1983) (criticism of the formalist and objectivist traditions underlying modern legal thought as a characteristic theme of the movement); White, The Inevitability
of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN.L. REV.649, 649-57 (1984) (critical legal studies' selfidentification with legal realism is an attempt to achieve legitimacy); Note, 'Round and
'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV.
L. REV.1669, 1677 (1982) (critical legal scholars have a "particularly close kinship" to
legal realist forebears, and the work of the former can be understood as a "maturation"
of the work of the latter).
For a critical assessment of the critical legal studies movement, see Hutchinson &
Monahan, Law, Politics, and The Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drnma of
American Legal Thought, 36 STAN.L. REV.199 (1984); Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want
to be Radical?, 36 STANL. REV.247 (1984); Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through
Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN.L. REV.413 (1984); Sunstein, Politics and Adjudication, 94
ETHICS126 (1983); Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said Than Done (Book Review), 96 HARV.L. REV.1466 (1983).
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE
6
88. See Kairys, Introduction, in THEPOLITICS
n.* (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (critical legal scholars borrow heavily from the "Marxist tradition and current trends in Marxist thought").
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doctrines to be historically contingent by demonstrating their
change over time in response to judicial class biases and judicial
perceptions of the material needs of capitalist society.8e Second,
they show legal reasoning to be fundamentally incoherent by
elaborating the logical contradictions or "opposing principles"
underlying private law, particularly the law of the marketplace,
contract law.80Thus, they view legal analysis as ideological, nonrational argumentatione1 that is used to legitimate existing social
practice^.^^
89. See M. HORWITZ,
THETRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN
LAW(1977). Professor Horwitz argues that precapitalist, communitarian doctrines of private law made way for
nineteenth century capitalist-oriented doctrines because of the class sympathies of
judges and their historically limited perceptions of social needs. However, this account of
legal development is disputed. See, e.g., Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History
of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.533 (1979) (demonstrating that no such shift occurred in
contract law during the period Horwitz describes); White, The Intellectual Origins of
Torts in America, 86 YALEL.J. 671 (1977) (providing a fundamentally different account
of the development of tort theory).
For other examples of the critical legal studies argument for the development of
American law, see Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline
of a Method for Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN.L. REV.601, 601, 604 (1977) (arguing
that law is composed of "interpretive activity, arising in concrete social situations" and
that legal structure encompasses a mode of interpretation "at the level of the implicit
legal consciousness moving within the whole of social discourse"); Tushnet, Perspectives
on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's "A History of
American Law," 1977 WIS. L. REV.81 (tracing the development of American law and
noting the impact on legal structure and social order from societal norms and "autonomous internal dynamics"); see also Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN.L. REV.57
(1984).
90. See Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 21. Professor Kennedy argues
that "there are two opposed rhetorical modes for dealing with substantive issues [found
in American private law opinions, articles, and treatises] which I call individualism and
altruism." Id. a t 1685; see also Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30
UCLA L. REV.829 (1983); Unger, supra note 87.
91. See Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
STAN.L. REV.591 (1981). Professor Kelman depicts legal argument as involving "interpretive construction," or the conscious and unconscious reduction of factual situations to
substantive legal controversies, and "rational rhetoricism," or "the process of presenting
the legal conclusions that result when interpretive constructs are applied to the 'facts.' "
Id. a t 592. In Kelman's view, the necessary imposition of interpretive constructs prior to
the employment of rational rhetoricism radically undercuts the rationality of legal
argument:
[Ilnterpretive constructs. . . are . . . simply inexplicably unpatterned mediators
of experience, the inevitably nonrational filters we need to be able to perceive
or talk,at all. . . . When the unwarranted conceptualist garbage is cleared away,
dominant legal thought is nothing but some more or less plausible commonwisdom banalities, superficialities, and generalities, little more on close analysis
than a tiresome, repetitive assertion of complacency that "we do pretty well,
all considered, when you think of all the tough concerns we've got to balance."
Legal thought does have its rigorous moments, but these are largely grounded
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Other less organized remnants of legal realism can be found
in other contemporary writings. In his leading law school primer
on judicial reasoning,03 E. H. Levi portrays adjudication in terms
of organic growth in the law whereby the "concepts" that express the law change in response to changed conditions in society.04 His model implies that judicial "intuition" is the vehicle
by which a judge registers and implements into law the changed
"concepts" of s o ~ i e t yIn
Sanford Levinson, maintain. ~contrast,
~
ing that the unavailability of determinate meaning in literary interpretation applies equally to judicial interpretation, argues
that every judicial interpreter is radically impaired in his ability
to confidently express the meaning of the text or to reject the
meaning proposed by another.96 The "contingency of percep-

in weak and shifting sands. There is some substance, but we tend to run for
cover when it appears.
Id. a t 671-72; see also Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN.L. REV.293 (1984); Kairys, supra note
88, a t 3 ("There is no legal reasoning in the sense of legal methodology or process for
reaching particular, correct results." Law is "only a wide and conflicting variety of stylized rationalizations from which courts pick and choose."); Trubek, Complexity and
Contradiction in the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social Thought
About Law, 11 LAW& SOC'YREV.529, 561 (1977) ("I see the [legal] system as partially
open and flexible, and therefore as offering support for moral and political 'entrepreneurs' who can take advantage of the pressures of ideals and the legitimation needs of
the system to effect changes that can further genuine equality, individuality, and
community.").
92. See Gabel, supra note 89, a t 602 (traditional legal theory produces fictions by
hypostatizing phenomena into facts); Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation,
90 YALEL.J. 1275, 1276 (1981) (traditional legal scholarship contributes to legitimation
of oppressive social order); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
BUFFALO
L. REV.209 (1979) (the Commentaries legitimated existing social practices in
Blackstone's England through the creation of artificial legal categories that gradually
assumed an appearance of necessity).
TO LEGAL
REASONING
(1948).
93. E. LEVI,AN INTRODUCTION
94. Id. a t 6-9.
95. In Levi's model of reasoning, "concepts" (such as consideration and trespass),
not legal rules, are the main vehicles of the law. See Levi, The Natural Law, Precedent
and Thurman Arnold, 24 VA. L. REV.587, 604 (1938). His model follows Max Radin's
portrayal of judicial reasoning as a selection between "several categories [that] struggle
. . for the privilege of framing the situation before [the judges]." Radin, The Theory of
Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357,359 (1925). Radin argues that
" 'principles' are not princip!es
a t all but aggregations of type transactions, schematized
to make them easier to carry in one's memory." Id. a t 360; see also K. LLEWELLYN,
TRADITION, supra note 53 (conceptions such as "type situation" and "situation-sense" are
basic to judicial reasoning). However, these pictures of judicial reasoning provide no normative guidance for weighing the "concepts" or "categories." See J. RAWLS,
supra note
74, a t 34.
96. Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX.L. REV.373 (1982). For a criticism of this
position, see Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEX.L. REV.495 (1982).
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tion" results in "fractured and fragmented d i s c o u r ~ e , "leaving
~~
the interpreter with only a mere "hope that some future conjunction of author and reader will provide a common language of
Ijudicial] d i s c o u r ~ e . " ~ ~
In sum, legal realism and its heirs basically argue that judicial interpretation is an unavoidable expression of privately held
values because of the unavailability of effective interpretive constraints. They see normative guidance as being unavailable because it is not self-evident: a variety of meanings is attributable
to the same precedent or statute and contradictory meanings exist among different precedents and statutes. Therefore, judicial
interpreters are compelled to choose from among the available
meanings-a choice that can be made only on extralegal bases
that include the privately held values of the judicial interpreter.
Similarly, institutional demands that a judicial interpreter perform in a certain fashion are ineffective. The irrepressible subjective motivations of the judicial interpreter make it impossible
to ensure the judicial interpretation of a text within any objective constraint.

The Anglo-American jurisprudential traditions of objective
and subjective interpretivism both presume that judicial interpretation is a free and discretionary activity. The principal difference between these two traditions lies in the extent to which
they believe that the judicial interpreter can be controlled in exercising his freedom and discretion. On one hand, the objective
interpretivist tradition constructs normative and institutional
constraints that supposedly prevent the responsible judicial interpreter from freely resorting to personal, value-laden considerations. On the other hand, the subjective interpretivist tradition
denies the authority and efficacy of such constraints, concluding
that judicial interpretation is an activity motivated by nonrational subjective interests.
Unfortunately, both traditions have failed to examine critically their common presumption that interpretation is by nature
free and discretionary. Rather, each tradition has directed its efforts a t contesting the availability of interpretive constraints.
97. Levinson, supra note 96, at 402-03.
98. Id.
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The result has been the incapacity of both jurisprudential traditions to transcend their opposition. Thus, while objective interpretivism's preoccupation with constructing normative and institutional constraints has prevented it from investigating the
possible structure of interpretation, subjective interpretivism's
primary interest in deconstructing these constraints has diverted
its attention away from the need to explain the otherwise "mysterious" act of i n t e r p r e t a t i ~ n . ~ ~
The objective-subjective opposition can be transcended by
denying the common presumption about the nature of interpretation. In other words, if interpretation is shown not to be free
99. Professor Edgar Bodenheimer once argued that the divergent ideological commitments of analytical positivism and legal realism prevented them from providing "a
well-considered theory of the non-formal (i.e., non-positive) sources of the law."
Bodenheimer, supra note 75, at 375. Responding to H.L.A. Hart's "open texture" characterization of legal rules, Bodenheimer maintained that Hart's continuing commitment to
the analytical positivist ideal of judicial objectivity inhibited him (and would inhibit all
other analytical positivists) from investigating the possible structure of judicial discretion. On the other hand, the legal realists' continued assurance to jurists "of the immense range of irrational considerations entering into the judicial process, the subjectivity necessarily inherent in judicial determinations, [and] the dominating influence of
prejudices, idiosyncrasies, and preconceived social theories in the disposition of lawsuits"
diverted his focus from "presenting us with an embracive theory of the constructive elements necessary for the building of a serviceable science of legal methodology." Id. a t
376. In short, the ideological commitments of analytical positivism and legal realism were
"leading the science of law into a blind alley from which it can extricate itself only by an
extensive and serious re-investigation of the entire realm of legal methodology." Id. a t
375; see also R. UNGER.KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS
3, 104-42 (1975) (characterizing conceptions of reason intrinsic to Western thought in the sciences, humanities, and jurisprudence as dichotomous, which results in a "prison house" for thought from which escape
is possible only with a "total criticism" of the "deep structures" of our thought and a
transcendence of the dichotomies with a "holistic consciousness"); Gross, supra note 5
(outlining jurisprudential "patterns of evasion" of the rule-value dichotomy); Reynolds,
supra note 5 (following Bodenheimer's analysis).
Charles A. Miller's description of judicial interpretation is one example of the "blind
alley" or "prison house" effect flowing from objective-subjective dichotomous views of
adjudication:.
The three sources of decision-values, rules, and facts-combine to focus on
the mysterious "act of deciding." While the sources of decision are rationally
comprehensible, the act of deciding is not. But after that act, adjudication becomes understandable once more when the opinion of the court, the explanation of decision, is handed down.
C. MILLER,THESUPREME
COURTAND THE USESOF HISTORY11 (1969) (footnote omitted).
This description vacillates helplessly between objective and subjectiJe accounts without
hope of any synthesis. For this reason, the act of judicial interpretation remains mysterious. A similar vacillation is evident within legal realism between its scientific and intuitionist wings. See supra text accompanying notes 61-78. More recently, Professor Dworkin's position has been characterized as a vacillation between objectivity and
subjectivity. See Fish, supra note 5.
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and discretionary, then the disagreement between objective and
subjective interpretivism over the availability of effective contraints for interpretation disappears. No ground exists to support the disagreement. Jurisprudential discussion of adjudication is then necessarily transformed to reflect the new view of
interpretation.'OO
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects the notion that interpretation is free and discretionary.lO' Interpretation is a dialogical
100. Generally, advocates of the resolution of the objective-subjective opposition in
jurisprudence have sought to construct a method of reasoning that integrates the objective and subjective dimensions of human experience. For instance, see Roberto Unger's
argument, supra note 99. In Unger's estimation, an "order of mind" must be constructed
that exists "between" the particularity of events in human experience and the generality
of concepts and symbols constituting the content of human thought. Id. a t 107-11. Further, this "order of mind" must employ neither the subjective valuations associated with
the particularity of events nor the logic and causality associated with the generality of
thought, but rather a "symbolic interpretation" that merges these two. Id. Examples of
this interpretation are found in the aesthetic experience of finding universal meaning
and concrete particularity in a great work of art or the religious experience of finding
Christ as an embodiment of both the universal, infinite God and the particular, finite
man. Id. a t 144; see also Gross, supra note 5.
In contrast, Professor Noel Reynolds contended that the escape from Bodenheimer's
"blind alley" should begin with a complete reformulation of the classical ideal of legal
objectivity into a notion of objectivity that more fully "squares . . . with actual human
experience." Reynolds, supra note 5, a t 27. In his estimation, this could be achieved by
seeing legal generalizations as publicly corrigible; see also Fiss, supra note 1.
101. The term "hermeneutics" can be traced to the Greek noun, hermeneia, meansupra note 4, a t 12-32. The term hermeneia appears
ing interpretation. See R. PALMER.
to be derived from the name of the Greek god Hermes. Essentially, Hermes' task was to
translate, or bring into a form intellectually accessible to human understanding, the
transcendent knowledge of the gods. Analysis of Hermes' divine function of mediation
between the world of gods and the world of men reveals a three-fold dimensionality that
hermeneia, or interpretation, had for the early Greeks. First, Hermes was to reveal and
proclaim the will of the gods to men. Thus, interpretation connoted an announcing of
what was previously unrevealed. Id. a t 15-20. Second, Hermes was to elucidate what was
revealed by relating it to the listeners' own projects and intentions. Thus, interpretation
to the Greeks carried with it the implication of a context in which the receivers of the
message found themselves. The problem of interpretation was making clear the message
in terms of the receivers' anticipations of meaning. Id. a t 20-26. Third, Hermes was to
bring the unintelligible into intelligibility through the medium of the people's own language. He was a translator who sought to mediate man's own understanding with the
gods' understanding. For the Greeks, interpretation meant a mediation of world views, a
fusion of different understandings in which interpreter and object both operated. Id. a t
26-32.
Hermeneutics did not begin to assume the form of a theory of interpretation until
the Reformation. Arguing that the Bible could be understood independently and validly
without the dogmatic interpretation of the Catholic Church, the Reformers sought a theory of biblical exegesis that would allow their interpretation to stand on its own. See J.
BLEICHER,
supra note 4, a t 12-13; see also H. GADAMER,
TRUTHAND METHOD153-55
(1975). The Reformers argued that any textual passage, the sense of which is not clear,
could be understood through the reciprocal relationship between the whole text and its
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interaction between interpreter and text that occurs within an a
priori relationship that is mediated by their common history
and language. In this interaction, neither interpreter nor text determines textual meaning independently of the other; both interpreter and text contribute interdependently to the determination of textual meaning. In essence, philosophical
particular passages. While the whole scriptural text guided the interpretation of the particular passages, the meaning of the whole could be reached only through the cumulative
understanding of individual passages. From sacred texts, it was only a small step to apply the same insight to profane texts.
Until Friedrich Schleiermacher, "special" hermeneutics existed in the various disciplines, depending upon the kind of text involved and the theoretical problems peculiar
to the discipline. Schleiermacher sought to establish a "general" hermeneutic underlying
all specialized hermeneutics by trying to elucidate the foundational act of all hermeneutics-the
act of understanding itself. Arguing that understanding occurs primarily
through a comparing of the unintelligible to the already intelligible, he schematized the
act of understanding as a circle. Just as the unclear meaning of a particular textual passage is made clear by reference to the general meaning of the whole text, so is any particular experience made intelligible by reference to what has already been understood. But
what has already been understood is only the accumulation of the meaning of particular
experiences. This schema of understanding-the general informing the particular and
the particular informing the general-became known as the "hermeneutical circle." See
J . BLEICHER,
supra note 4, a t 13-16; H. GADAMER,
supra, a t 162-74; R. PALMER,
supra note
4, a t 75-97.
Following Schleiermacher's attempt to generalize hermeneutics, Wilhelm Dilthey
sought to make hermeneutics the foundation for all the human sciences by providing a
universally valid methodological basis for the interpretation of all human expressions.
Dilthey believed that employment of the hermeneutical circle could lead to a knowledge
of the human world resembling the natural sciences' knowledge of nature. Asserting that
the meaning of all human action lay in the subjective intention of the actor, Dilthey
reasoned that the task of understanding was to reconstruct the actor's original "lifeexperience" by way of the hermeneutical circle in order to understand the actor as he
supra note 4, a t 19-26; H. GADAMER,
supra, a t 192understood himself. See J . BLEICHER,
supra note 4, a t 98-123. In this respect, Dilthey presages Collingwood's
234; R PALMER.
objective reenactment theory of interpretation. See supra note 8.
Dilthey's notion of understanding marked a decisive turn in hermeneutic theory-a
turn that Hans-Georg Gadamer viewed as wrong. In Gadamer's view, Dilthey's hermeneutics impiied that the inquirer's present situation had a negative value. Understanding
the actor as he understood himself required "essentially a self-transposition or imaginative projection whereby the [inquirer] negates the temporal distance that separates him
from the object and becomes contemporaneous with it." Linge, Introduction to H.
GADAMER,
PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS,
a t xiv (1976). In other words, temporal distance
between the inquirer and the object of his inquiry is a source of prejudice that hinders
valid understanding and that must be transcended. T o the extent that Dilthey's notion
of understanding demands negation of the inquirer's present and extrication from his
immediate historical situation, Gadamer believed Dilthey's hermeneutic theory must be
rehabilitated. Gadamer argued that the interpreter can never extricate himself from the
entanglements of his history and the prejudices that come with those entanglements.
The interpreter's history is always constitutively involved in his process of understanding. Id.
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hermeneutics sees interpretation as an activity of mutual constraint between the interpreter and the text.

A.

The Historicality of Interpretation

Philosophical hermeneutics' rejection of the free and discretionary view of interpretation begins with an argument for the
fundamental historicality of interpretation. Philosophical hermeneutics contends that every interpreter is historically situated. To be historically situated means to be inextricably located
within a relational context that bears the stamp of the past.lo2
An interpreter's historical situatedness implies both that the interpreter cannot encounter the present without a direction to his
project and a perspective of his text that are dictated to him
from his past and, equally important, that there are parameters
to his project and boundaries to his perspective. In other words,
the interpreter's past not only provides certain possibilities for
seeing the present, it also limits what can possibly be seen.
Both the possibilities and the limitations of the interpreter's
present are a manifestation of the interpreter's "effective-history."lo3 The effective-history of an interpreter "determines in
advance both what seems to [him] worth enquiring about and
what will appear [to him] as an object of inve~tigation."'~~
Put
another way, it is the interpreter's "horizon," or "range of vision[,] that includes everything that can be seen from a particu102. See H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 225-74. Gadamer is deeply indebted to
Martin Heidegger for this view of the interpreter. In his phenomenology of man, Heidegger contended that man's being is "Dasein" (There-Being). M. HEIDEGGER.
BEINGAND
TIME(1962). In other words, man is always located temporally and spatially. However,
man does not exist solipsistically; his being is "Being-in-the-world." Id. a t 78-90. By
"world," Heidegger means not just the natural environment of entities, but the relational
context in which man always finds himself immersed and in terms of which each entity is
pregrasped and preunderstood. Id. a t 91-145. The existential structures of "Being-in-theworld" are man's primordial "being-with" objects of experience, his "being-in" situations, and his "being-towards" (caring for) objects of experience. Id. a t 149-273. Each of
these structures presumes that man "grasps in advance" the objects of his experience
because of his primordial relation to them. Id. a t 188-95. Consequently, human understanding has a prestructure which comes into play in all interpretation. For this reason,
"[ilnterpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to
us" in advance. Id. a t 191-92. Gadamer seized upon these basic insights about man and
interpretation. "Heidegger's temporal analytics of human existence (Dasein) has, I think,
shown convincingly that understanding is not just one of the various possible behaviours
of the subject, but the mode of being of [man] itself." H. GADAMER.
supra note 101, a t
xviii; see also J. BLEICHER,
supra note 4, a t 98-103; R. PALMER,
supra note 4, a t 124-61.
supra note 101, a t 267-74.
103. H. GADAMER.
104. Id. a t 267-68.
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lar vantage point."lo5 Moreover, the effective-history of an interpreter infuses him with pre-judgments that he cannot possibly
dispossess himself. Because he sees the present only in terms of
judgments that he has drawn in the past, the interpreter's past
judgments predispose him to judge the present in the same way.
The interpreter always approaches the text with certain expectations that reflect his past experience.lo6
Not only is the interpreter historically situated, but so is his
text. The effective-history of the text is manifest in the manner
in which it has been previously understood. Its "horizon" is the
range of its prior interpretations; its pre-judgment is how it has
come to be judged by others.lo7 Importantly, it is the text's
grounding in history that makes its present interpretation possible. The interpreter's and the text's sharing of history allows the
interpreter to have access to the text, to find relation with it, or
to have a basis for understanding it at all. In other words, a
common history provides the medium for interpreting the text
and determining its meaning.
Given the historicality of both interpreter and text, philosophical hermeneutics maintains that interpretation and meaning are possible only because of the interpreter's historically
based pre-judgments of the text. This claim is illustrated by re105. Id. at 269.

106. H. GADAMER.
The Universality of the Herrneneutical Problem (1966), in PHILOHERMENEUTICS
9 (1976).
[Tlhe historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of
the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience.
Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions
whereby we experience something-whereby what we encounter says something to us.
Id. Certainly, one of the most controversial aspects of philosophical hermeneutics is the
notion that pre-judgment has positive, rather than negative value for interpretation.
Gadamer attributes the negative connotation of pre-judgment to the Enlightenment. H.
GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 239-45. The Enlightenment idealized reason as the autonomous determiner of judgments. Pre-judgments were seen as being remnants of an unenlightened mentality that impedes rational self-determination. Truth was obtained by rejecting pre-judgments and establishing an impartial system of rules and methodological
principles. Gadamer seeks to rehabilitate the concept of pre-judgment. Given man's historicality, pre-judgments are an ontological fact.
107. In the case of an interpreter's original reading of a text, the horizon of the text
is not so much evident in its historicality as it is in its linguisticality. In this case, the
text is intellectually accessible to the interpreter primarily because of their sharing of a
common language. As will be shown in section C, language has an horizon too; it is the
peculiar world view of the community that possesses the language. See infra text accompanying notes 134-41. For this reason, the interpreter will always have certain expectations of meaning from the language in which he is immersed.
SOPHICAL
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flecting on the common interpretation of any written text. When
an interpreter encounters a written text, he performs an act of
projection. He projects onto the text the meaning that he anticipates the text as a whole may have for him; his "effective-history" disposes him to pre-judge the possible meaning of the text.
However, in projecting the "fore-meaning"lo8 of the text, the interpreter may encounter passages that call into question its suitability and adequacy as an account. Most likely, the interpreter
will be "pulled up short by the text," signifying that the projected meaning of the text "does not yield any meaning or [the
text's] meaning is not compatible with what [the interpreter]
had expected."109 Consequently, the interpreter is compelled to
account for the unsettling passage in his understanding of the
text and to revise his fore-meaning accordingly. The revised
fore-meaning then becomes the newly projected meaning, and
the process of projection from fore-meaning to particular textual
passages and back to fore-meaning continues as before. "The
working out of this fore-project, which is constantly revised in
terms of what emerges as [the interpreter] penetrates into the
meaning, is understanding what is there.""O
In this illustration, the interpreter's pre-judgments "constitute the initial directedness of [his] whole ability to experience
[the text] at all."ll1 His pre-judgments direct him to the text as
an object worthy of inquiry; they are the ground for his initial
interest in reading the text. Moreover, his pre-judgments direct
him along a particular course of inquiry; they are the fore-meanings that he projects for the text as a whole and that are revised
as they become challenged by the text itself. Although the interpreter's pre-judgments constitute his initial direction, they do
not necessarily constitute solely his understanding of the text.
His pre-judgments may turn out to be legitimate, and thus pro108. H.GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 237.
109. Id. For a brief discussion of what philosophical hermeneutics intends in the
word "meaning," see supra note 122 and authorities cited therein.
supra note 101, a t 236. The constant movement from the inter110. H. GADAMER,
preter's pre-judgment of the text to a particular passage of the text and back to prejudgment, with both informing each other, illustrates the basic epistemological model of
philosophical hermeneutics known as the "hermeneutical circle." See supra note 101.
The "hermeneutical circle" should not be understood to be viciously inescapable. For a
cogent clarification of this commonly misunderstood aspect of philosophical hermeneutic
theory, see D. HOY,supra note 4, a t 2-6.
111. H. GADAMER,
The Universality of the Herrneneutical Problem (1966), in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS
9 (1976).
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ductive for understanding, if they are confirmed in being
"worked out" with the passages of the text. But his pre-judgments may also turn out to be illegitimate, and thus unproductive for understanding, if they "come to nothing in the working
out."l12 In either case, however, it is only in terms of the interpreter's pre-judgments that judgments of the text can be
reached. The crucial point is that pre-judgments become legitimate or illegitimate only if the interpreter allows them to be
challenged and questioned by the object of his inquiry. Otherwise, the interpreter's pre-judgments become definitive and prescribe how he will understand the text.
An interpreter prevents his pre-judgments from prescribing
his understanding of the text by being "effective-history cons c i o u ~ . "Such
~ ~ ~c ~ n ~ c i o u entails
~ n e ~ awareness
~
of his pre-judgments and suspension of the effects of his effective-history. Admittedly, suspension of effective-history is impossible in any
absolute sense. "The prejudices and fore-meanings in the mind
of the interpreter are not at his free disposal. He is not able to
separate in advance the productive prejudices that make understanding possible from the prejudices that hinder understanding
and lead to misunderstanding^.""^ But latent pre-judgments
can be teased into the foreground of awareness through an open
and direct confrontation with the text. In confronting the text,
the interpreter encounters its "otherness" which throws his prejudgments into contrasting relief and thereby casts them into
the foreground of awareness for his critical s c r ~ t i n y . " ~
Although the text is historically related to the interpreter, it
is nonetheless "an historically intended separate ~bject.""~In
other words, it is not only physically separate but also temporally distant in its creation from the interpreter's present. Im112. H. GADAMER.
supra note 101, a t 237.
113. Id. a t 268-71.
114. Id. a t 263.
115. Linge, supra note 101, a t xx-xxi. Linge illustrates this phenomenon in the history of cultures:
[I]t is in times of intense contact with other cultures (Greece with Persia or
Latin Europe with Islam) that a people becomes most acutely aware of the
limits and questionableness of its deepest assumptions. Collision with the
other's horizons makes us aware of assumptions so deep-seated that they
would otherwise remain unnoticed. This awareness of our own historicity and
finitude-our consciousness of effective history-brings with it an openness to
new possibilities that is the precondition of genliine understanding.
Id. a t xxi.
116. H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 263.
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portantly, every interpreter, even the creator of the text, must
accomplish his interpretation across some temporal distance
that is never "a closed dimension, but is itself undergoing constant movement and extension."l17 This means that the interpreter always occupies a new present in relation to the text, giving him a new perspective (or pre-judgment) of the text that is
shaped by concerns and expectations inherited from his constantly extending past. For this reason, a text is always endowed
with a sense of "otherness," or st ran genes^."^^^ T o be sure, the
text retains its sense of "familiarity"110 as well, because of its
presence in the interpreter's history (and, as will be shown later,
language); this familiarity is manifest in the interpreter's capacity to pre-judge the text.
Thus, the interpreter's open and direct confrontation with
the text reveals a "polarity of familiarity and st ran genes^."'^^
This polarity creates a contrast between what the interpreter
presently expects to understand from the text and what the text
historically has to say.
If a person is trying to understand something, he will not be
able to rely from the start on his own chance previous ideas,
missing as logically and stubbornly as possible the actual
meaning of the text until the latter becomes so persistently audible that it breaks through the imagined understanding of it.
Rather, a person trying to understand a text is prepared for it
to tell him something. That is why a hermeneutically trained
mind must be, from the start, sensitive to the text's quality of
newness. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither 'neutrality' in the matter of the object not the extinction of one's self,
but the conscious assimilation of one's own foremeanings and
prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one's own
bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness and
thus be able to assert its own truth against one's own foremeanings.lZ1
In other words, if the interpreter is open to the text, meaning
that he is genuinely prepared to receive its message, then the
text may expose his pre-judgments by way of establishing a contrast between itself and those pre-judgments. In this way, the
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 266.
at 262.
at 262-63.
at 238.
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interpreter becomes aware of his pre-judgments and avoids the
prescriptive effect they would have on his understanding of the
text were they to remain latent in his consciousness.
This open confrontation between the interpreter's pre-judgments and the text is the process by which the true meaning of
the text emerges.122In allowing constantly emerging pre-judgments to be contrasted and tested against the text, the interpreter is in the position to discard pre-judgments that obscure
textual understanding and to retain pre-judgments that are confirmed by the text. In short, temporal distance between interpreter and text does not obstruct understanding, but actually
produces it. Temporal distance acts as a "filtering process;" it
"not only lets those prejudices that are of a particular and limited nature die away, but causes those that bring about genuine
understanding to emerge clearly as
For this reason, interpretation and the determination of meaning are never a completed task, but are "an infinite process."124
In sum, the view of interpretation that emerges from a dis122. In the parlance of philosophical hermeneutics, meaning is something that
neither inheres in an object nor attaches to it as an arbitrary projection of thought.
Meaning is contextual, occurring only in relationships with the interpreter. Meaning is
seen as always being "for us;" it is found in making the unintelligible intelligible in terms
of our present concerns and expectations, just as Hermes made the unintelligible world
of the gods intelligible to man through the medium of man's own language. See R.
PALMER,
supra note 4, a t 118-21, 184.
This determination of meaning is thus dependent on the interpreter making the text
"applicable" to him. Application is a crucial dimension of interpretation. See D. HOY,
supra note 4, a t 51-61. Gadamer believed that interpretation in theological and judicial
contexts is particularly exemplary of this dimension:
In both legal and theological hermeneutics there is the essential tension between the text set down-of the Law or of the proclamation-on the one hand
and, on the other, the sense arrived a t by its application in the particular moment of interpretation, either in judgment or in preaching. A law is not there
to be understood historically, but to be made concretely valid through being
interpreted. Similarly, a religious proclamation is not there to be understood as
a merely historical document, but to be taken in a way in which it exercises its
saving effect. This includes the fact that the text, whether law or gospel, if it is
to be understood properly, i.e., according to the claim it makes, must be understood a t every moment, in a particular situation, in a new and different way.
Understanding here is always application.
H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 275, 289-305. Both judicial and theological interpretation
see the task as an effort to mediate the temporal distance between the historic text and
the present situation. Thus, interpretation is not the objective reconstruction of another
world in its own terms, nor the subjective determination of the world in terms of the
interpreter's own vision and thoughts.
123. H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 265-66.
124. Id. a t 265.
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cussion of its historicality is fundamentally different from objective and subjective interpretivism. Interpretation is a dynamic
interaction, between the interpreter (his pre-judgments) and the
text (its historical meaning), from which meaning is determined.
The interpreter's pre-judgments contribute to the determination
of meaning by providing the basis on which the text is made
intelligible to the interpreter. But these pre-judgments do not
prescribe meaning. So long as the text is allowed to have expression and to challenge the interpreter's pre-judgments, the text
contributes to the determination of meaning by compelling revised understandings of it. As a result, interpretation is neither
free nor constrained, but is free and constrained. It is free in the
sense that the interpreter approaches the text in accordance
with his pre-judgments concerning it. But it is also constrained
in the sense that these pre-judgments, shared by both interpreter and text in their common historical medium, are subject
to modification and revision in the interaction between the interpreter and the text.

B.

The Dialogical Structure of Interpretation

As maintained in section A, interpretation requires openness to the text, meaning that the interpreter lays open the possibility that the text may have something to say different from
the interpreter's expectation of its meaning. But in so doing, the
interpreter assumes the risk that the suitability of his pre-judgments for understanding the text may be called into question by
the claims of the text itself. Indeed, the laying open of possibilities for other meanings of the text is the "essence of the question."l2Vor this reason, interpretation is said to have the struc~ ~ text asserts its claims, calling into
ture of q ~ e s t i 0 n i n g . lThe
question the interpreter's pre-judgments; the interpreter answers with revised judgments of the text that are drawn in terms
of his prior understandings and the message of the text, but
125. Id. at 266. Gadamer indicates elsewhere that the openness that is "questioning"
is not intermittent, but continuous and infinite.
Dialectic, as the art of asking questions, proves itself only because the person
who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in his questioning, which
involves being able to preserve his orientation towards openness. The art of
questioning is that of being able to go on asking questions, [i.e.,] the art of
thinking. It is called "dialectic", for it is the art of conducting a real
coversation.
Id. at 330.
126. Id. at 266.
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which may be called into question again by other textual
passages.
This question-answer-question structure suggests that the
interpretive interaction between the interpreter and the text is
dialogical. Indeed, dialogue is precisely the relationship the interpreter achieves with the text. The dialogues of Plato are paradigmatic of the character of the dialogue that occurs in interpretation.12? The purpose of the Platonic dialogues is for the
interlocutors to reach a transcendent understanding about an issue of common concern. Importantly, the individuality of each
interlocutor is not to be neutralized but is significant in achieving of this understanding. For instance, the confrontation between Socrates, the man of contemplation, and Callicles, the
~ ~ their peculiar pre-judgman of action, in the G o r g i a ~ lcasts
ments into contrasting relief for their mutual scrutiny. The result of their confrontation is thus more likely to be true understanding because it is accomplished in terms of each others' prejudgments and transcends each one's purely subjective
perspective.
The interlocutors of a Platonic dialogue move beyond their
subjective perspectives when they inquire into the subject matter of the dialogue. In other words, the more an interlocutor
opens himself to the subject matter, the more his personal opinions cease to prescribe his understanding. An interlocutor becomes engaged in an inquiry with the other interlocutors and
falls out of an interrogation of them.12@He gets "caught up" in
127. Id. a t 325-41.
DIALOGUES
OF PLATO299-307 (E. Hamilton and H. Cairns ed.
128. THECOLLECTED
1961).
129. The distinction is crucial. Genuine dialogue is a focus on some subject matter,
not on the particular interlocutors. To conduct a conversation "requires that one does
not try to out-argue the other person, but that one really considers the weight of the
supra note 101, a t 330. The effort to "out-argue" is an
other's opinion." H. GADAMER,
undertaking that presumes the validity of one's own position and focuses on changing
another person's views to conform with one's own. However, this kind of dialogue is inconsistent with the requirement of openness that leads to understanding because it is so
uninterested in the other. Genuine dialogue is openness to another person's views, which
changes the tenor of the undertaking into a common inquiry about some issue of common concern.
Just as there are legitimate and illegitimate pre-judgments, see supra text accompanying notes 111-12,so there are legitimate and illegitimate inquiries (or questionings).
Legitimate (or "true") questioning is an inquiry with the answers still undetermined.
Illegitimate (or "false") questioning is an inquiry with predetermined answers; it is concerned with hearing only what it has already decided is worthwhile to hear. This kind of
supra note 101,a t 326questioning is illegitimate because it is so one-sided. H. GADAMER,
27.
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the conversation; he becomes engaged or possessed by the backand-forth movement of the dialogue. At this point, the dialogue
takes on a life of its own that is filled with unanticipated developments that carry the interlocutor beyond his present perspective.130 Although we frequently say that one may "conduct" a
conversation, or dialogue, "the more fundamental a conversation
is, the less its conduct lies within the will of [the parties]. . . .
Philosophical hermeneutics rejects illegitimate questioning in all its forms, including
methods of prescribed inquiry. Methods are rejected as illegitimate because of their prescription of a correct answer to their inquiries:
Strictly speaking, method is incapable of revealing new truth; it only renders
explicit the kind of truth already implicit in the method. The discovery of the
method itself was not arrived a t through method but dialectically, that is,
through a questioning responsiveness to the matter being encountered. In
method the inquiring subject leads and controls and manipulates; in dialectic
the matter encountered poses the question to which he responds.
R. PALMER,
supra note 4, a t 165. The philosophical roots for the rejection of methods are
found in M. HEIDEGGER,
Question, supra note 5, a t 3; M. HEIDEGGER,
Age, supra note 5,
a t 115.
130. "What emerges in its truth is the logos, which is neither mine nor yours and
hence so far transcends the subjective opinion of the partners to the dialogue that even
the person leading the conversation is always ignorant." H. GADAMER.
supra note 101, a t
331. Later, Gadamer argues that the phenomenon of "hearing" illustrates the impossibil.
ity of subjectivity in genuine dialogue. Id. a t 419-21.
Unlike seeing, where one can look away, one cannot "hear away" but must
listen, unless the language is an alien one or is mere chatter. Even idle chatter
has a way of captivating the listener against his will. Hearing implies already
belonging together in such a manner that one is claimed by what is being said.
D. HOY,supra note 4, a t 66.
The notion of being carried by the dialogue is illuminated by a second phenomenon
used to support the hermeneutic view of interpretation-the phenomenon of a game (or
"playing"). H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 91-114. The fundamental characteristic of
the phenomenon of playing is the total absorption of the player in the back-and-forth
movement of the game. In genuine playing, a player does not hold himself back in selfawareness, reflecting on the game as an object of definable procedures and rules. A
player who cannot lose himself in earnest in the playing is a "spoilsport"-one who cannot play. Id. a t 91-92. Similarly, playing "cannot be taken as an action of subjectivity. . .
.and self-possession. The real subject of playing is the game itself." Linge, supra note 101,
a t xxiii. The playing possesses the players; it has primacy over the players engaged in it.
Moreover,
[tlhe movement of playing has no goal in which it ceases but constantly renews
itself. That is, what is essential to the phenomenon of play is not so much the
particular goal it involves but the dynamic back-and-forth movement in which
the players are caught up-the movement that itself specifies how the goal will
be reached.
Id. In other words, playing has its own momentum and carries its players along with it.
The point is that interpretation involves the same kind of absorption of the interpreter
in the question-answer-question movement between himself and the text.
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[Tlhe people conversing are far less the leaders of it than the
led. No one knows what will 'come out' in a con~ersation."'~~
This phenomenon of dialogue illustrates the nature of the
relationship to be achieved between the interpreter and the text.
Like dialogue, interpretation is an inquiry into a subject matter
that concerns both the interpreter and the text. Like dialogue,
interpretation also requires an openness to the particular viewpoint of another, meaning "acknowledgment that [the interpreter] must accept some things that are against [him~elf]."'~~
Only in this way do both the interlocutor and the interpreter
permit themselves to be engaged by the dialogical interaction
and carried by it beyond their present perspectives. In short,
both [dialogue and interpretation] are concerned with an object that is placed before them. Just as one person seeks to
reach agreement with his partner concerning an object, so the
interpreter understands the object of which the text
speaks. . . .
. . . [In] the successful conversation they both come under
the influence of the truth of the object and are thus bound to
one another in a new community . . . [it is] a transformation
into a communion, in which we do not remain what we were.'33
Again, this dimension of the philosophical hermeneutic
characterization of interpretation differs fundamentally from the
presumption of objective and subjective interpretivism. Interpretation is not an essentially free and discretionary activity for
which the existence of constraints is in dispute. Because interpretation does not occur independently of the dialogical relation
between the interpreter and the text, it makes no sense to view
the interpreter as essentially free to construe the text according
to his subjective values. Interpretation is not a manipulative action of the interpreter's subjectivity, but is rather his placing of
himself in dialogue with the text so that both the interpreter
and the text move into a new understanding.

C.

The Linguisticality of Interpretation

In sections A and B, interpretation has been shown to be a
131. H GADAMER.
supra note 101, at 345.
132. Id at 324.
133. Id. at 341 (footnote omitted). The elevation of the interpreter's pre-judgments
and the claims of the text into a higher generality, or "communion," is what philosophical hermeneutics terms the "fusion of horizons." Id. at 273.
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transsubjective event. Both the interpreter and the text are absorbed in a dialogical interaction from which new understandings arise. But the peculiar perspective of neither the interpreter
nor the text is to be extinguished. The confrontation of these
perspectives initiates the dialogical movement towards understanding because of their contrast. In previous sections of this
comment, the medium in which the dialogical interaction of interpretation occurs has been referred to simply as the common
history of the interpreter and the text. However, this historical
relation is not to be construed as something vague and intangible; it has its concrete manifestation in language. For this reason, language is seen as being the "concretion of effective-historical ~ o n s ~ i o ~ s n e ~ s . " ~ ~ ~
The history of both the interpreter and the text makes itself
known in the present by way of language. Language is the concrete means by which the judgments and understandings of the
past are carried into the present. Thus, the interpreter's effective-history that provides his present pre-judgments exists in
the language he employs.
To say that the horizons of the present are not formed at all
without the past is to say that our language bears the stamp of
the past and is the life of the past in the present. Thus the
prejudices [that philosophical hermeneutics] identifies as more
constitutive of our being than our reflective judgments can now
be seen as embedded and passed on in the language we use.
Since our horizons are given to us prereflectively in our language, we always possess our world linguistically. Word and
subject matter, language and reality, are inseparable, and the
limits of our understanding coincide with the limits of our
common language.lS5
Thus, the mediation that occurs between an interpreter and the
text, as in the dialogue between interlocutors, can be seen as
"the full realisation of conversation, in which something is expressed that is not only [the interpreter's] or [his text's], but
The linguisticality of effective-history means that interpretation can occur neither prelinguistically nor extralinguistically.
Not only does the text appear to the interpreter in terms of lan134. Id. at 351.
135. Linge, supra note 101, at xxviii.
136. H. GADAMER.
supra note 101, at 350.
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guage, but the interpreter can approach the text only in terms of
language. There is no world outside language.I3'
[Tlhe linguistic quality of our experience of the world is prior,
as contrasted with everything that is recognised and addressed
as being. The fundamental relation of language and world does
not, then, mean that world becomes the object of language.
Rather, the object of knowledge and of statements is already
enclosed within the world horizon of language. The linguistic
nature of the human experience of the world does not include
making the world into an 0 b j e ~ t . l ~ ~

In other words, there is no world outside its presence as the subject matter of some language community. One cannot experience
language prior to experiencing the world, nor the world prior to
experiencing language. "We cannot see a linguistic world from
above in this way, for there is no point of view outside the experience of the world in language from which it could itself become
an
Consequently, language is not simply an optional function
that the interpreter engages in or does not engage in a t will.I4O
137. The idea of "world" has peculiar significance in philosophical hermeneutics.
The idea has its origins in Martin Heidegger's phenomenology of man. See supra note
102. World is not the environment, the sum total of all objects; i t is rather the entire
relational context in terms of which every object is pregrasped. Therefore, the world is
never separate from man; it is prior to any separation from the objects of the world. M.
HEIDEWER.supra note 102, a t 91-148. Philosophical hermeneutics carries forward
Heidegger's notion of world by making explicit that the human experience of world is
supra note 101, a t 397-414.
linguistic. H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 408.
138. H. GADAMER.
139. Id. a t 410. T h e peculiar world of a language community is known to any person
who has mastered a foreign language. T h e language is a repository of cultural-historical
experience. Consequently, many of its words and phrases have a richness of meaning
that reflects that experience and, therefore, can be fully understood only by total immersion in the culture of the language community. Not surprisingly, translation of such
words and phrases requires much more than mechanical synonym finding; it requires
explanation of the foreign context of understanding. However, even with such an explanation there is always a sense of the loss of the dimensions of the language. See id. a t
345-51.
140. The fact that the world cannot be grasped prelinguistically or extralinguistically is illustrated by our complete possession by language in even thinking about
language:
[All1 thinking about language is already once again drawn back into language.
We can only think in a language . . . .
Language is not one of the means by which consciousness is mediated with
the world. . . . Language is by no means simply an instrument, a tool. For i t is
in the nature of the tool that we master its use, which is to say we take it in
hand and lay i t aside when it has done its service. T h a t is not the same as
when we take the words of a language, lying ready in the mouth, and with their
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Language is beyond the interpreter's manipulative control because it is between him and the text, making possible his very
relating to it. The interpreter cannot first have an extralinguistic
contact with the text and then put the text into the instrumentation of language. "Language is not just one of man's possessions in the world, but on it depends the fact that man has a
world at all."141Language is the very relational context in terms
of which any text is pregrasped. Indeed, because language is presupposed in every act of interpretation of any text, it is prior to
any separation of the interpreter and the text. Language is,
therefore, prior to all objectivity and subjectivity since both are
conceived within a schema that separates subject from object.

Philosophical hermeneutics is a theory of interpretation
that directly conflicts with the view of interpretation assumed in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. The assumption is that interpretation is free and discretionary, meaning that no common standards exist between the interpreter and the text to provide guidance for evaluating and judging the text. In a fundamental
sense, the interpreter and text are assumed to be independent of
each other. This assumption yields two approaches to adjudication. The objective interpretivist approach constructs preestablished norms for inquiry that reflect the characteristics of the
text itself so that the interpreter's judgment identifies with the
text. The subjective interpretivist approach insists that judg-

ments of the text will be drawn only in terms of the interpreter's
preconceptions of the text. In other words, while the objectivist
sees an independent text as determining understanding, the subjectivist sees an independent interpreter as determining
understanding.
The hermeneutic theory of interpretation, on the other
hand, views interpretation as a dialogical interaction of interuse let them sink back into the general store of words over which we dispose.
Such an analogy is false because we never find ourselves as consciousness over
against the world and, as it wore [sic], grasp after a tool of understanding in a
wordless condition. Rather, in all our knowledge of ourselves and in all knowledge of the world, we are always already encompassed by the language that is
our own.
H. GADAMER,
Man and Language (1966), in PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS
62 (1976).
141. H.GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t 401.
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preter and text that is mediated by their common history and
language. As a result, neither interpreter nor text is sufficiently
independent to be determinative of meaning. The text prevents
the interpreter from being the sole determiner of meaning by
providing a contrasting relief against which the interpreter's prejudgments are brought to awareness for critical scrutiny. Likewise, the interpreter prevents the text from being the sole determiner of meaning since the text is intelligible only in terms of
the interpreter's pre-judgments. In these fundamental ways, the
determination of meaning is beyond the control of either interpreter or text; indeed, both contribute to the determination of
meaning interdependently.
In contrast to Anglo-American jurisprudence, philosophical
hermeneutics concludes that interpretation is never an activity
in need of constraints because it is a structure of existential constraints. These existential constraints are the interrelations that
exist between the interpreter and the text prior t o interpretation. The interpreter's access to the text is made possible only
because of the a priori mediation provided by their shared historical and linguistic context. This contextual interrelatedness
provides both the possibilities and the limitations of the interthe interpreter and text stand in a dia~ r e t a t i 0 n . lMoreover,
~~
logical relation without which interpretation cannot possibly occur. The dialogical relation is prior to interpretation in the sense
142. A similar idea has been expressed by Professor Stanley Fish in a critical response to Dworkin's "chain novel" analogy for adjudication. Fish criticizes Dworkin for
presuming the interpretive freedom of the first author in the chain. See supra note 41.
[Tlhe first author has surrendered his freedom (although, as we shall see, surrender is exactly the wrong word) as soon as he commits himself to writing a
novel . . He must decide, for example, how to begin the novel, but the decision is not "free" because the very notion "beginning a novel" exists only in
the context of a set of practices that a t once enable and limit the act of beginning. One cannot think of beginning a novel without thinking within, as opposed to thinking "of," these established practices, and even if one "decides"
to "ignore" them or "violate" them or "set them aside," the actions of ignoring
and violating and setting aside will themselves have a shape that is constrained
by the preexisting shape of those practices. This does not mean that the decisions of the first author are whollv determined. but that the choices available
to him are "novel writing choices," choices that depend on a prior understanding of what it means to write a novel, even when he "chooses" to alter that
understanding. In short he is neither free nor constrained (if those words are
understood as referring to absolute states), but free and constrained. He is free
to begin whatever kind of novel he decides to write, but he is constrained by
the finite (although not unchanging) possibilities that are subsumed in the notions "kind of novel" and "beginning a novel."
Fish, supra note 5, a t 553.
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that interpretation cannot be undertaken without the open dialogical interaction of interpreter and text. Importantly, these interrelations are said to be existential because they constitute the
very manner of the interpreter's existence with the text.14=
Again, the implication is that interpretation is so fundamental
to the interpreter's means of knowing the text that the act of
interpretation cannot be manipulatively controlled by the
interpreter.
The view of interpretation provided by philosophical hermeneutics represents a direct theoretical challenge to AngloAmerican jurisprudence. Because Anglo-American jurisprudence
presumes that interpretation is an essentially unrestrained activity, the jurisprudential debate has focused on the availability of
constraints for interpretation. Unfortunately, this debate has
proceeded without a specific and systematic examination of the
nature of interpretation upon which the entire debate rests.
Philosophical hermeneutics is challenging because its examination of the nature of interpretation concludes that interpretation
is not what traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence has
blindly presupposed. Therefore, the ground upon which the objective and subjective interpretivist debate stands is gone.
This theoretical challenge deserves careful attention from
Anglo-Amerithe Anglo-American jurisprudential c~mmunity."~
143. The fundamental existentiality of these constraints in the act of interpretation
prompted one commentator to conclude as follows:
The task of philosophical hermeneutics, therefore, is ontological rather than
methodological. It seeks to throw light on the fundamental conditions that underlie the phenomenon of understanding in all its modes, scientific and nonscientific alike, and that constitute understanding as an event over which the
interpreting subject does not ultimately preside.
Linge, supra note 101, a t xi. Consequently, philosophical hermeneutics "pervades all
human relations to the world." H. GADAMER,
supra note 101, a t xi. Its issue is "not what
we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and
supra note 102.
doing." Id. a t xvi. See generally M. HEIDEGGER,
144. The purpose of this comment is to direct Anglo-American jurisprudential attention to its unexamined assumption about the nature of interpretation and to the philosophical hermeneutic challenge to this assumption. The presentation of a philosophical
hermeneutic theory of law is beyond the scope of this comment. However, the present
avoidance of an articulation of this theory does not mean that philosophical hermeneutics offers little or nothing that is directly relevant to the judicial context. Several ideas
of jurisprudential relevance may be derived from the outline of philosophical hermeneutics provided herein.
First, the idea of the historical mediation of the past with the present is relevant. A
judicial interpreter can be easily characterized as situated in a historical present, facing
the present expectations of litigants that are based on prior judgments drawn by legislative writers or other judicial interpreters. The judicial interpreter's adjudicative task is
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can jurisprudence can only stand to benefit by directing its attention to the theory of interpretation provided by philosophical
hermeneutics. In the very least, attention to the hermeneutic
theory of interpretation, even if it were ultimately rejected,
could induce the critical and systematic jurisprudential study of
the nature of interpretation that has heretofore been assumed
but never studied. However, careful attention to the hermeneutic theory of interpretation will more than likely lead to an
abandonment of the prevailing jurisprudential assumption about
the nature of interpretation and a transcendence of the objective
and subjective interpretivist debate that preoccupies AngloAmerican jurisprudence.

James J. Hamula

to mediate these conflicting historically-based expectations, including his own pre-judgments that may come into play with the interests of the present case. See supra note
122.
Second, the idea that this mediation occurs in language is relevant to the judicial
context. Law is language-bound because all the materials of the law have their existence
in language. Any use of these materials in any context, including negotiation, litigation,
and adjudication, occurs in language as well. In a very important sense then, the judicial
interpreter is a necessarily obligated participant in language. The consequence of his
participation is that his resolution of the litigants' claims is regulated by the same terms
and conditions of language that regulated the linguistic articulation of those claims.
Third, and perhaps most important, the idea of the dialogical structure of interpretation is ,relevant to the judicial context. In the adjudicative process, the judicial interpreter is obligated to hear claims that he might not otherwise want to hear, to listen to
all persons who will be directly affected by his resolution of their claims, and to respond
specifically to these claims by resolving them and assuming responsibility for that resolution. In other words, the adjudicative process institutionally compels the judicial interpreter to confront openly and directly the interests and expectations of others. Philosophical hermeneutics indicates the significance of this confrontation for the judicial
interpreter. The judicial interpreter's pre-judgments are brought to awareness (for him
as well as for others) only when cast into contrasting relief against judgments that are
different from his own. Once his pre-judgments are illuminated, they are more easily
subject to critical evaluation (by him as well as -by others) for their suitability in the
resolution of the dispute. In sum, the judicial interpreter is restrained by the very nature
of his undertaking from interpreting in a free and discretionary manner.

